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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION, OPERATIONS, AND MANAGEMENT (U)

HEADQUARTERS, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WASHINGTON, DC 20301 8 July 1979

INTELLIGENCE PLANNING/MANAGEMENT

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION, OPERATIONS, AND MANAGEMENT (U)

1. (U) PURPOSE: To describe Defense Intelligence activities, functions, and processes and list the specific intelligence responsibility of each Department of Defense (DoD) component based on current U.S. Government directives.

2. (U) REFERENCES:

- a. DoD Directive 5137.1, "Assistant Secretary of Defense (Communications, Command, Control and Intelligence)," 11 March 1977.
- b. DoD Directive 5105.21, "Defense Intelligence Agency," 19 May 1977.
- c. DoD Directive S-5100.20, "The National Security Agency and the Central Security Service," 23 December 1971.
- d. DoD Directive S-3115.7, "Signals with Intelligence," 25 January 1973.
- e. National Security Council Intelligence Directives No.'s 1, 2, and 3, 17 February 1972.
 - f. Executive Order 12036, 24 January 1978.

- g. 1977/78 United States Government Manual.
- h. Report of Secretary of Defense to the Congress, 25 January 1979.
- 3. (U) APPLICABILITY AND SCOPE: This manual applies to all DoD intelligence components, outlines the intelligence relationships of these DoD components, and explains how the complex Defense Intelligence system operates. The information contained in this manual is designed to improve DoD intelligence planning, programming, budgeting, operations, and management by providing in one document a comprehensive description of Defense Intelligence activities, products, and services.
- 4. (U) AUTHORITY: This publication provides intelligence guidance to all DoD components and is issued under the authority delegated in DoD Directive 5105.21, "Defense Intelligence Agency," by the Secretary of Defense to the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency.
- 5. (U) SUPERSESSION: This manual supersedes DIAM 56-3, 30 December 1975.

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INTRODUCTION

(U) In past years, the need for a single DoD document to describe the present complex organizational, operational, and management relationships in the Defense Intelligence Community was recognized. Accordingly, this manual was written to satisfy this need. DIAM 56-3 describes the Defense Intelligence activities and processes, and lists the

specific intelligence responsibility of each DoD intelligence component based on current U.S. Government directives. The information contained in this manual is designed to be used as reference material within the DoD, to orient newly-assigned Defense Intelligence personnel, and to provide a teaching vehicle for the Defense Intelligence School.

BASIC PRINCIPLES

- 1. (U) GUIDANCE: Official statements by the President, the Secretary of Defense, and directives of the National Security Council (NSC), provide the primary guidance and direction from which U.S. Defense strategy and related Defense Intelligence plans, programs, and budgets are developed. Intelligence support of national Defense policies requires current knowledge of foreign military, scientific, political, and economic developments which may affect U.S. national security. This, in turn, requires continued collection and production of essential intelligence about foreign armed forces, their strengths, capabilities, vulnerabilities, and estimates of their possible future military threats to the United States and its international interests.
- 2. (U) GOALS: U.S. Government national security decisions are based, to a considerable degree, on military intelligence produced by DoD Intelligence components. Therefore, the basic goal of U.S. Defense Intelligence is to provide responsible officials of the U.S. Government, particularly DoD officials and military commanders, with the accurate and timely foreign military intelligence needed to aid them in their planning and decisionmaking. In this context, Defense Intelligence activities must strive for the earliest identification and accurate interpretation of foreign armed forces' threats which may require immediate diplomatic and/or military actions by the United Additionally, the Defense Intelligence Community must maintain detailed knowledge of foreign scientific and technical (S&T) developments and related military trends which may affect U.S. Defense planning and programming in the long-range and mid-range periods.
- 3. (U) USER NEEDS: The increasing power and effectiveness of modern military weapons and delivery systems, and the interrelationships among foreign diplomatic, economic, and military activities, have

- resulted in increasing demands for timely and comprehensive Defense Intelligence. Strategic air, underwater, and space weapons systems, in particular, require maximum intelligence attention. Defense Intelligence of this kind is used on a continuing basis by the President, the NSC, the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the Secretary of State, other appropriate senior Government officials, and military commanders of all echelons.
- 4. (U) SECURITY: Successful Defense Intelligence activities require vigilant and continuing security of products and sources. Security measures must be constantly reviewed and adjusted to support changing Defense Intelligence activities. Inadvertent disclosures relating to DoD intelligence collection and surveillance methods, sources or final results, may cause foreign governments to increase their counterintelligence activities. This may, in turn, increase costs and decrease effectiveness of U.S. intelligence operations. However, a balance must be maintained between security and the user's "need-to-know."
- 5. (U) 'VALUE: The value of intelligence activities cannot be directly equated to dollars. Value of finished intelligence must be measured by its usefulness to U.S. decisionmakers and to the defense of the United States. Collection, processing, and production of intelligence, therefore, must be planned, programmed, and conducted in accordance with approved goals and objectives to insure that collection is targeted against validated requirements. The costly and unique nature of many intelligence resources and the variety of continuing needs for intelligence by users at all levels dictate that all U.S. intelligence resources be properly planned, programmed, budgeted, and operated as objective-oriented systems to satisfy all essential U.S. requirements. To support officials at these many levels of authority requires an integrated, well-managed and responsive Defense Intelligence system.

THE U.S. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

- 1. (U) ORGANIZATION OF U.S. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE:
- a. (U) The foreign intelligence activities of the United States, as authorized by the National Security Act of 1947, are organized to satisfy the requirements of the President, the NSC, and specific departments and agencies of the U.S. Government. The "U.S. Foreign Intelligence Community" consists of those departments, agencies, and units which are authorized by law or presidential order to conduct U.S. foreign intelligence or counterintelligence operations. For a variety of reasons they are not in a common chain of command. Each component of the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Community is administratively subordinate to the respective department or agency to which assigned. However, overall national intelligence policy, which guides their operations, is coordinated by a single U.S. Government intelligence official, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). He is appointed by the President, subject to approval by the U.S. Senate, and is responsible to the NSC.
- b. (U) The NSC acts as the highest Executive Branch entity that provides review of guidance for and direction to the conduct of all national foreign intelligence and counterintelligence activities. The Policy Review Committee (PRC) and Special Coordination Committee (SCC) of the NSC assist in carrying out the NSC's responsibilities in the foreign intelligence and counterintelligence areas.
- c. (U) The U.S. Foreign Intelligence Community consists of the following organizations: the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), National Security Agency (NSA), offices within the DoD for the collection of specialized national foreign intelligence through reconnaissance programs, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State, the intelligence elements of the military services, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Department of Treasury, Department of Energy and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and the staff elements of the office of the DCI.
- 2. (U) THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT: The National Security Act of 1947 (amended), as implemented by the NSC, laid the foundation for an inter-departmental "intelligence community" which had evolved from the competing post-World War II

- intelligence interests of several U.S. Government departments. The Act established the office of the DCI and the CIA, and provided for a Presidential appointee to serve as both the DCI and as the Director, CIA. The DCI advises the President and the other members of the NSC regarding the intelligence aspects of national security and coordinates intelligence activities of the U.S. Government. He carries out these responsibilities through his chairmanship and/or membership on senior U.S. Government or NSC intelligence boards and committees, which involve planning, reviewing, coordinating, and evaluating U.S. intelligence programs and activities.
- 3. (U) EXECUTIVE ORDER 12036, 24 JANUARY 1978: This order builds on the experience gained under the superseded Executive Order 11905 which insured that foreign intelligence and counterintelligence activities are conducted in full compliance with the laws of the United States and are consistent with broader national security policies. It establishes oversight of the direction, management and conduct of the foreign intelligence activities of the Federal clarifies the authority Government and responsibilities of the DCI and the departments and agencies that have foreign intelligence and counterintelligence responsibilities. The important features of the Order are as follows:
- a. (U) The NSC and its two standing committees

 the SCC and the PRC short of the President,
 provide the highest level review of and guidance for
 the policies and practices of the Intelligence
 Community.
- (1) (U) The PRC, when acting on intelligence matters, is chaired by the DCl and defines and establishes priorities for consumer requirements for intelligence, making sure these are reflected in budget decisions and evaluating analytical products. This insures that the needs of the most important users of intelligence guide the entire intelligence process.
- (2) (U) The SCC, chaired by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, reviews and makes recommendations to the President on special activities and sensitive foreign intelligence collection operations. This committee also assumes responsibility for developing doctrine for counterintelligence activities.

- b. (U) The authorities and responsibilities of all departments, agencies, and senior officials engaged in foreign intelligence and counterintelligence activities are made public. Those implementing directives, which must remain classified for security reasons, will be made available to the appropriate Congressional oversight committees. The Order implements an earlier presidential decision to centralize under the DCI the most important national intelligence management functions -- collection requirements, budget control and analysis - while operational and support activities are left unchanged and decentralized. The specific operational responsibilities of each of the elements of the Intelligence Community, as well as their most important community relationships, are spelled out. Two important organizational mechanisms are established to facilitate these functions:
- (1) (U) The National Intelligence Tasking Center, operating in peacetime under the control of the DCI or, under the Secretary of Defense when the President so directs, coordinates and tasks national foreign intelligence collection programs.
- (2) (U) The National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB), which includes the members of the Intelligence Community, is an advisory body to the DCI on all foreign intelligence activities and the budget.
- c. (U) The methods employed by the intelligence agencies must meet Constitutional standards protecting the privacy and civil liberties of U.S. personnel and must be in full compliance with the law. To accomplish this objective a major section of Executive Order 12035 is devoted entirely to setting forth detailed restrictions on intelligence collection, special activities in support objectives, experimentation policy contracting, assistance to law enforcement authorities, personnel assigned to other agencies, indirect participation in prohibited activities, dissemination and storage of information, and a prohibition on assassinations. The FBI's intelligence activities no longer have a blanket exception to these restrictions. At the heart of the restriction process is a greatly enhanced role for the Attorney General, as the nation's top legal officer, to establish and approve procedures to regulate the conduct of the most sensitive intelligence activities. These detailed procedures, which will be made available to the Congressional oversight committees, will insure compliance with the law, protect Constitutional rights and privacy, and insure that any intelligence activity within the United States or directed against Americans will employ the least

- intrusive means possible and that the use, dissemination, and storage of such information is limited to that necessary to achieve lawful governmental purposes.
- d. (U) As an added protection against abuses and to help insure effective performance, the intelligence oversight process is strengthened.
- (1) (U) The Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB) reviews foreign intelligence and counterintelligence activities that may be illegal or improper, and is given new authority to conduct investigations.
- (2) (U) The DCI and senior officers of the Intelligence Community are instructed to report to the Congressional intelligence committees in a complete and prompt manner.
- 4. (U) AUTHORITY OF THE DCI: The DCI is responsible directly to the NSC and:
- a. (U) Acts as the primary advisor to the President and the NSC on national foreign intelligence and provides the President and other officials in the Executive Branch with national foreign intelligence.
- b. (U) Acts as head of the CIA and of such staff elements, as may be required for discharge of the Director's Intelligence Community responsibilities.
- c. (U) Acts, in appropriate consultation with the departments and agencies, as the Intelligence Community's principal spokesman to the Congress, the news media and the public, and facilitates the use of national foreign intelligence products by the Congress in a secure manner.
- d. (U) Develops, consistent with the requirements and priorities established by the PRC, such objectives and guidance for the Intelligence Community which will enhance capabilities for responding to expected future needs for national foreign intelligence.
- e. (U) Promotes the development and maintenance of services of common concern by designated foreign intelligence organizations on behalf of the Intelligence Community.
- f. (U) Insures implementation of special activities.
- g. (U) Formulates policies concerning intelligence arrangements with foreign governments and

coordinates intelligence relationships between agencies of the Intelligence Community and the intelligence or internal security services of foreign governments.

- h. (U) Conducts a program to protect against overclassification of foreign intelligence information.
- i. (U) Insures the establishment by the Intelligence Community of common security and access standards for managing and handling foreign intelligence systems, information, and products.
- j. (U) Participates in the development of procedures required to be approved by the Attorney General governing the conduct of intelligence activities.
- k. (U) Establishes uniform criteria for the determination of relative priorities for the transmission of critical national foreign intelligence, and advises the Secretary of Defense concerning the communications requirements of the Intelligence Community for the transmission of such intelligence.
- 1. (U) Provides appropriate intelligence to departments and agencies not within the Intelligence Community.
- m. (U) Establishes appropriate committees or other advisory groups to assist in the execution of the foregoing responsibilities.
- 5. (U) U.S. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY BOARDS, COMMITTEES, AND ADVISORS: National foreign intelligence and counterintelligence operations are reviewed, guided by and receive direction from the following NSC-related intelligence activities (see enclosure 1, chart 1):
- a. (U) NSC Policy Review Committee (PRC). The PRC, when carrying out its intelligence responsibilities, is chaired by the DCI and is composed of the Vices President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Treasury, the Secretary of Defense, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and the Chairman of the JCS, or their designees, and other senior officials, as appropriate.
 - (1) (U) The PRC.
- (a) (U) Establishes requirements and priorities for national foreign intelligence.
- (b) (U) Reviews the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) and budget proposals and

reports to the President as to whether the resource allocations for intelligence capabilities are responsive to the intelligence requirements of the members of the NSC.

- (c) (U) Conducts periodic reviews of national foreign intelligence products, evaluates the quality of the intelligence product, develops policy guidance to insure quality intelligence and to meet changing intelligence requirements.
- (d) (U) Submits an annual report on its activities to the NSC.
- (2) (U) Recommendations of the PRC on intelligence matters may be appealed to the President or the NSC by any member of the PRC.
- b. (U) NSC Special Coordination Committee (SCC). The SCC is chaired by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and its membership includes the statutory members of the NSC and other senior officials, as appropriate.
- (1) (U) Special Activities. The SCC considers and submits to the President a policy recommendation, including all dissents, on each special activity. When meeting for this purpose, the members of the SCC include the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Chairman of the JCS, and the DCI.
- (2) (U) Sensitive Foreign Intelligence Collection Operations. Under standards established by the President, proposals for sensitive foreign intelligence collection operations are reported to the Chairman by the DCI for appropriate review and approval. When meeting for the purpose of reviewing proposals for sensitive foreign intelligence collection operations, the members of the SCC include the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the DCI, and such other members designated by the Chairman to insure proper consideration of these operations.
- (3) (U) Counterintelligence. The SCC develops policy with respect to the conduct of counterintelligence activities. When meeting for this purpose the members of the SCC include the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the Director of OMB, the Assistant to the

President for National Security Affairs, the Chairman of the ICS, the DCI, and the Director of the FBI. The SCC's counterintelligence functions include:

- (a) (U) Developing standards and doctrine for the counterintelligence activities of the United States.
- (b) (U) Resolving interagency differences concerning implementation of counterintelligence policy.
- (c) (U) Developing and monitoring guidelines for the maintenance of central records of counterintelligence information.
- (d) (U) Submitting to the President an overall annual assessment of the relative threat to U.S. interests from intelligence and security services of foreign powers and from international terrorist activities, including an assessment of the effectiveness of U.S. counterintelligence activities.
- (e) (U) Approving counterintelligence activities which, under such standards as may be established by the President, require SCC approval.
- (4) (U) Required Membership. The SCC discharges the responsibilities assigned only after consideration in a meeting at which all designated members are present, or in unusual circumstances when any such member is unavailable, when a designated representative of the member attends.
- (5) (U) Additional Duties. The SCC also conducts an annual review on ongoing special activities and sensitive national foreign intelligence collection operations and reports thereon to the NSC; and carries out such other coordination and review activities as the President may direct.
- (6) (U) Appeals. Any member of the SCC may appeal any decision to the President or the NSC.
- c. (U) NFIB. The NFIB advises the DCI concerning production, review, and coordination of national foreign intelligence; the NFIP budget; interagency exchanges of foreign intelligence information; arrangements with foreign governments on intelligence matters; the protection of intelligence sources and methods; activities of common concern; and other matters referred to it by the DCI.
- (1) (U) The NFIB is chaired by the DCI and includes other appropriate officers of the CIA, the

- office of the DCI, the Department of State, the DoD, the Department of Justice, the Department of Treasury, the Department of Energy, the DIA, the offices within the DoD for reconnaissance programs, the NSA, and the FBI. A representative of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs may attend meetings of the NFIB as an observer.
- (2) (U) When the NFIB meets for the purpose of production review and coordination of national foreign intelligence, it is composed solely of the senior intelligence officers of the designated agencies. The senior intelligence officers of the Army, Navy, and Air Force may attend all meetings of the NFIB as observers.
- d. (U) National Intelligence Tasking Center (NITC). The NITC was established under the direction, control, and management of the DCI for coordinating and tasking national foreign intelligence collection activities. The NITC is staffed jointly by civilian and military personnel including designated representatives of the chiefs of each of the DoD intelligence organizations engaged in national foreign intelligence activities. Other agencies within the Intelligence Community may also designate representatives.
- (1) (U) The NITC is the central mechanism by which the DCI:
- (a) (U) Translates national foreign intelligence requirements and priorities developed by the PRC into specific collection objectives and targets for the Intelligence Community.
- (b) (U) Assigns targets and objectives to national foreign intelligence collection organizations and systems.
- (c) (U) Insures the timely dissemination and exploitation of data for national foreign intelligence purposes gathered by national foreign intelligence collection means, and insures the resulting intelligence flow is routed immediately to relevant components and commands.
- (d) (U) Provides advisory tasking concerning collection of national foreign intelligence to departments and agencies having information collection capabilities or intelligence assets that are not a part of the NFIP. Particular emphasis is placed on increasing the contribution of departments or agencies to the collection of information through overt means.
 - (2) (U) The NITC has the authority to resolve

conflicts of priority. Any PRC member may appeal such a resolution to the PRC; pending the PRC's decision, the tasking remains in effect.

- (3) (U) All responsibilities and authorities of the DCI concerning the NITC will be transferred to the Secretary of Defense upon the express direction of the President. To maintain readiness for such transfer, the Secretary of Defense will, with advance agreement of the DCI, assume temporarily during regular practice exercises all responsibilities and authorities of the DCI concerning the NITC.
- e. (U) Office of the DCI Staff. The office of the DCI Staff is a small functional group of experienced intelligence specialists structured to provide the DCI with staff support in the following areas: (1) intelligence program review, (2) intelligence plans and evaluation, (3) intelligence budgetary and financial data handling review.
- f. (U) The Intelligence Research and Development (R&D) Council is a permanent committee to advise the DCI on R&D matters pursuant to his responsibilities under Executive Order 12036.
- g. (U) 10B. The President's 10B functions within the White House. The 10B has three members who are appointed by the President from outside the Government and are qualified on the basis of ability, knowledge, diversity of background and experience. One member is designated by the President as chairman.

(1) (U) The IOB:

- (a) (U) Reviews periodically the practices and procedures of the Inspectors General and General Counsel for agencies within the Intelligence Community (they have the responsibility to discover and report to the IOB intelligence activities that raise questions of legality or propriety), and considers written and oral reports authorized under its charter.
- (b) (U) Reviews periodically for adequacy the internal guidelines of each agency within the Intelligence Community concerning the legality or propriety of intelligence activities.
- (c) (U) Reports periodically, at least quarterly, to the President on its findings and reports in a timely manner to the President any intelligence activities that raise serious questions of legality or propriety.

- (d) (U) Forwards to the Attorney General, in a timely manner, reports received concerning intelligence activities in which a question of legality has been raised or which the IOB believes to involve questions of legality.
- (e) (U) Conducts such investigations of the intelligence activities of agencies within the Intelligence Community as the Board deems necessary to carry out its functions under the Order.
- (2) (U) No person who serves on the staff of the IOB will have any contractual or employment relationship with any agency within the Intelligence Community.
- h. (U) National Intelligence Officers (NIO's). The DCI appoints NIO's as his personal representatives for important geographical areas or functional activities in the U.S. intelligence community. The NIO's act as "Staff Officers" for the DCI and provide informal but direct contact throughout the Intelligence Community to insure coordinated support of National Intelligence Estimates (NIE's), production standards, evaluations, and product review. NIE's are coordinated through the U.S. Intelligence Community, approved by the NFIB, and are signed by the DCI. Each current NIE is considered the basic U.S. national estimate of specific regional or country trends and capabilities, and/or intentions. Special NIE's are requested by the NSC or the President and often involve the entire Intelligence Community.
- i. (U) Defense Intelligence Officers (DIO's). The Director, DIA, appoints DIO's for such geographic and/or topical areas of responsibility as he considers appropriate. The DIO's are senior staff representatives operating under DIA's Vice Director for Production (VP). Each DIO serves as:
- (1) (U) The Defense Intelligence interface with NIO's dealing with substantive matters of prime interest to the DoD and the JCS, to insure effective and coordinated Defense inputs to national intelligence efforts, in respective fields of assigned responsibilities.
- (2) (U) The principal substantive advisor of the Director, DIA, and senior professional expert within his respective field of responsibility. Each DIO advises the DIA on the responsiveness and objectivity of Defense Intelligence products, including alternative views of interpretations when appropriate, using to the greatest extent possible existing organizations, panels of experts, or committees in order to fully utilize DoD intelligence resources.

- (3) (U) The personal agent of the VP in identifying and evaluating the needs of intelligence users for Defense Intelligence products. Accordingly, each DIO maintains close personal contact with key users of military intelligence throughout the Defense establishment and elsewhere.
- (4) (U) A senior advisory officer, in assigned areas of responsibility, for particular issue-oriented problems of key concern to the Director, DIA, which involve several Defense Intelligence organizations. These duties may involve such matters as the quality of intelligence performance, possible remedial actions, and general resource implications.

6. (U) U.S. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES:

- a. (U) Basically, all U.S. Government foreign intelligence activities fall into four general categories military, S&T, political, and economic. In response to general or specific requirements, a variety of finished intelligence products are produced on these subjects from data which have been collected, processed, evaluated, and analyzed by various methods.
- (1) (U) One of the most difficult U.S. Government activities involves planning successful collection operations and producing accurate analytical reports which properly aid U.S. Government officials in making decisions. The worldwide information explosion of recent years has made these tasks more complex and costly, particularly the collection of needed information. Much information is obtained by routine, overt collection procedures. However, most of the data critical to national survival are obtained by clandestine or highly technical means.
- (2) (U) The budgetary need to program production and related collection resources and systems years in advance, for eventual use against changing and usually hostile target nations or forces, greatly complicates intelligence planning. In recent years, increasing use has been made of highly specialized technology to obtain information which most nations actively attempt to protect through a variety of complex security procedures. The result is that extremely costly technical collection systems, which supply large quantities of selected raw or semi-processed data for U.S. intelligence producers, have been developed and deployed throughout the world. Using data from such systems, U.S. intelligence activities prepare finished intelligence products which are designed for specific U.S. Government intelligence users. Much of this production is in the area of military

intelligence and is accomplished within the DoD.

b. (U) U.S. Government foreign intelligence activities are conducted primarily by the CIA, the Department of State, and the DoD. The scope of their activities is determined by their statutory responsibilities and NSC directives.

(1) (U) The CIA.

- (a) (U) Collects foreign intelligence and develops, conducts, or provides support for technical and other programs which collect national foreign intelligence. The collection of information within the United States is coordinated with the FBI as required by procedures agreed upon by the DCI and the Attorney General.
- (b) (U) Produces and disseminates foreign intelligence relating to the national security, including foreign political, economic, scientific, technical, military, geographic and sociological intelligence to meet the needs of the President, the NSC, and other elements of the Government.
- (c) (U) Collects, produces, and disseminates intelligence on foreign aspects of narcotics production and trafficking.
- (d) (U) Conducts counterintelligenæ activities outside the United States and coordinates counterintelligence activities conducted outside the United States by other agencies within the Intelligence Community.
- (e) (U) Without assuming or performing any internal security functions, conducts counter-intelligence activities within the United States but only in coordination with the FBI and subject to the approval of the Attorney General.
- (f) (U) Produces and disseminates counterintelligence studies and reports.
- (g) (U) Coordinates the collection outside the United States of intelligence information not otherwise obtainable.
- (h) (U) Conducts special activities approved by the President and carries out such activities consistent with applicable law.
- (i) (U) Conducts services of common concern for the Intelligence Community as directed by the NSC.

- (j) (U) Carries out or contracts for research, development and procurement of technical systems and devices relating to authorized functions.
- (k) (U) Protects the security of its installations, activities, information and personnel by appropriate means, including such investigations of applicants, employees, contractors, and other persons with similar associations with the CIA as are necessary.
- (1) (U) Conducts such administrative and technical support activities within and outside the United States which are necessary to perform its functions, including procurement and essential cover and proprietary arrangements.
- (m) (U) Provides legal and legislative services and other administrative support to the office of the DCI.
 - (2) (U) The Department of State.
- (a) (U) Overtly collects foreign political, sociological, economic, scientific, technical, political-military, and associated biographic information.
- (b) (U) Produces and disseminates foreign intelligence relating to U.S. foreign policy as required for the execution of the Secretary of State's responsibilities.
- (c) (U) Disseminates as appropriate, reports received from U.S. diplomatic and consular posts abroad.
- (d) (U) Coordinates with the DCI to insure that national foreign intelligence activities are useful to and consistent with U.S. foreign policy.
- (e) (U) Transmits reporting requirements of the Intelligence Community to the Chiefs of U.S. Missions abroad.
- . (f) (U) Supports Chiefs of Mission in discharging their statutory responsibilities for direction and coordination of mission activities.
 - (3) (U) The DoD.
- (a) (U) Collects national foreign intelligence and is responsive to collection tasking by the NITC.
- (b) (U) Collects, produces and disseminates foreign military and military-related intelligence

information, including scientific, technical, political, geographic and economic information as required for execution of the responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense.

- (c) (U) Conducts programs and missions necessary to fulfill national and tactical foreign intelligence requirements.
- (d) (U) Conducts counterintelligence activities in support of DoD components outside the United States in coordination with the CIA, and within the United States in coordination with the FBI pursuant to procedures agreed upon by the Secretary of Defense and the Attorney General, and produces and disseminates counterintelligence studies and reports.
- (e) (U) Directs, operates, controls, and provides fiscal management for the NSA and for Defense and military intelligence and national reconnaissance entities.
- (f) (U) Conducts signals intelligence (SIGINT) and communications security (COMSEC) activities, except as otherwise directed by the NSC.
- (g) (U) Provides for the timely transmission of critical intelligence, as defined by the DCI, within the U.S. Government.
- (h) (U) Reviews budget data and information on DoD programs within the NFIP and reviews budgets submitted by program managers to the DCI to insure the appropriate relationship of the NFIP elements to the other elements of the Defense program.
- (i) (U) Monitors, evaluates, and conducts performance audits of DoD intelligence programs.
- (j) (U) Carries out or contracts for research, development and procurement of technical systems and devices relating to authorized intelligence functions.
- (k) (U) Together with the DCI, insures that there is no unnecessary overlap between NFIP and DoD intelligence programs and provides the DCI all information necessary for this purpose.
- (1) (U) Protects the security of DoD installations, activities, information and personnel by appropriate means including such investigations of applicants, employees, contractors, and other persons

with similar associations with the DoD as are necessary.

- (m) (U) Conducts such administrative and technical support activities within and outside the United States which are necessary to perform the DoD intelligence functions.
- c. (U) Specific responsibilities for collection, processing, production, and dissemination of finished intelligence, based upon legal agency or departmental

missions, are authorized by the NSC and specified by the DCI. Responsibilities for performance of certain basic intelligence services are set forth in the National Security Council Intelligence Directives (NSCID's). Implementing actions are issued by the DCI in a series entitled the Director of Central Intelligence Directives (DCID's). Individual "departmental or agency regulations assign internal intelligence responsibilities within the parameters of these basic directives.

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

1. (U) DEVELOPMENT AND RELATIONSHIPS:

- a. (U) The intelligence activities of the DoD form a major effort within the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Community, particularly in terms of military intelligence production. DoD foreign intelligence activities, referred to in this manual as the "Defense Intelligence Community," have primary responsibility within the U.S. Government for management and production of finished intelligence on foreign armed forces, their military capabilities and related activities. This responsibility includes S&T, as well as economic and political information directly pertinent to the missions of the various components of the DoD. The primary members of the Defense Intelligence Community include the Assistant Secretary of Defense Command, Control (Communications, Intelligence) (ASD(C31)); Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Policy Review) (DUSD(PR)); the Director, DIA; the Director, NSA/Chief, Central Security Service (CSS); the intelligence chiefs of the Military Services and the Unified and Specified (U&S) Commands and their component commands. In addition, a variety of intelligence agencies, units, and activities are assigned to the Services or U&S Commands to accomplish supporting tasks. See enclosure 1, chart 2, for a diagram of Defense Intelligence Relationships.
- b. (U) The Defense Intelligence Community has evolved since the enactment of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, and the 1958 Defense Reorganization Act. These acts provide the basic legal authority for the DoD organization. In Congressional discussion on these bills, ir telligence was identified as one of the Defense support activities which could benefit from common DoD functional control and management. Two DoD intelligence agencies, the NSA * and the DIA, and certain special collection programs were established to improve the management of Defense Intelligence collection and production activities. The Secretary of Defense also was made responsible, as executive agent, for those Defense Intelligence collection resources which must be managed and controlled at the national level.
- c. (U) The NSA/CSS is responsible for centralized coordination, direction, and performance of highly specialized technical functions in support of U.S. Government activities to protect U.S. communications and processes foreign intelligence information. The

- NSA was established by Presidential directive in 1952 as a separately organized agency within the DoD. In this directive, the President designated the Secretary of Defense Executive Agent for the signals intelligence (SIGINT) and communications security (COMSEC) activities of the Government. In 1972, the CSS was established, in accordance with a Presidential memorandum, to provide a more unified cryptologic organization within the DoD and appointed the Director, NSA as Chief of the CSS. The NSA/CSS has two primary missions a COMSEC mission and a foreign intelligence information SIGINT mission.
- d. (U) The DIA was established by DoD Directive 5105.21, on 21 August 1961, and was charged to and management coordination non-cryptologic Defense Intelligence collection and production activities and reduce duplication of effort by the Services. The DIA, under provisions of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, operates under the direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense. The DIA is responsible for producing and disseminating Defense Intelligence to satisfy the intelligence requirements of the Secretary of Defense, the JCS, and major components of the DoD. It accomplishes this either by use of internal resources (through the management, control, and coordination of the intelligence functions of other DoD activities) or through cooperation with other intelligence organizations.
- e. (U) The scope of intelligence activities of the Military Services was altered considerably with the establishment of the NSA and DIA. However, the Services maintain intelligence staffs at all major levels of command to carry out the statutory responsibilities of the Military Departments for intelligence planning, programming, and training, as well as to support new weapons systems and combat developments.
- f. (U) In October, 1977, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) was reorganized, establishing an Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and an Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering.
- (1) (U) The Under Secretary for Policy is the primary advisor and staff assistant for such matters as international political military affairs and aims limitation negotiations, intelligence analysis and

requirements, and the integration of departmental plans and policies with overall national security objectives.

- (a) (U) Reporting to him is the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) (ASD(ISA)), who is also the principal Deputy to the Under Secretary for Policy.
- (b) (U) Subordinate to the ASD(ISA) is the DUSD(PR), who is the principal staff assistant for Defense policy as it relates to communications and intelligence analysis, requirements and priorities, as well as other policy matters as determined by the Secretary of Defense. The DUSD(PR) also reviews all intelligence and counterintelligence programs and budgets to insure that they are consistent with DoD policy and respond to valid requirements.
- (2) (U) The Under Secretary for Research and Engineering is the primary advisor and staff assistant on matters relating to research, engineering, acquisition, communications, command and control, and intelligence resources (including related warning and reconnaissance activities).
- (a) (U) Reporting to the Under Secretary for Research and Engineering is the ASD(C³I), who is responsible for the functions formerly performed by the Director, Telecommunications and Command and Control Systems and for the intelligence resource management functions, formerly performed by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence). He also serves as principal staff assistant in carrying out the Secretary's responsibilities as Executive Agent of the National Communications System (NCS).

2. (U) PRIMARY DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE GOAL AND MISSION:

- a. (U) The Defense Intelligence Community, by virtue of differing military intelligence requirements, has a complex organizational structure. The DIA and NSA are Defense agencies while other DoD intelligence components are established at various levels in the Services and U&S Commands. Thus, in many cases, different departmental views dictate different applications of the same finished intelligence products. The varied roles of these DoD intelligence components are described as a "system" in terms of the fundamental intelligence goals, missions, and functions which represent the current basis of all DoD intelligence activities.
 - h. (U) The basic goal of the Defense Intelligence

- system is to provide Government policymakers, military planners, and commanders with a reliable, timely and comprehensive appreciation of:
- (1) (U) The capabilities, vulnerabilities, and options available to foreign powers or factions to use their armed forces or other governmental power in a manner which will affect U.S. national interests, or U.S. military capabilities.
- (2) (U) Situations and contingencies which may require use of U.S. Armed Forces or other Defense programs by the United States.
- (3) (U) Other foreign factors which may affect the capabilities and/or options available to the United States, and which may affect planning and programming for future use of its armed forces.
- (4) (U) The threat posed by hostile foreign intelligence activities, subotage, and subversion against the DoD or its military units and forces.
- c. (U) The mission of Defense Intelligence in achieving this goal is to develop and maintain an intelligence system which:
- (1) (U) Satisfies the foreign military intelligence needs of the President, the NSC, the Secretary of Defense and his Assistants, the JCS, the Military Services, U&S Commands and their component and joint forces commanders, and other designated U.S. and international recipients.
- (2) (U) Provides a comprehensive, foreign military intelligence data base of current, basic, estimative, special, S&T, and management intelligence required for the planning and conduct of military operations.
- (3) (U) Provides the counterintelligence capability required to protect the DoD against hostile foreign intelligence activities (espionage, sabotage, subversion), and foreign terrorist activities.
- (4) (U) Functions with efficiency and maximum economy consistent with the needs of national security.
- (5) (U) Adjusts to changing requirements in periods of tension and to the needs of engaged forces in limited war, with minimum reorganization and augmentation.
 - (6) (U) Survives and continues to operate under

conditions of general war providing adequate redundancy and backup capability.

3. (U) THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM:

- a. (U) The operation of the Defense Intelligence system is based on sequential steps which can best be described as the Defense Intelligence cycle. This includes the standard intelligence functions of requirements, collection, processing, production, dissemination, and support. As discussed below, they augment the responsibilities, doctrines, and procedures for guiding joint intelligence activities of the Armed Forces as outlined in JCS Publication 2, "Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)."
- b. (U) The following list includes those steps which encompass the Defense Intelligence cycle. (Specific use of each step may vary within various functional or organizational activities.)
- (1) (U) Enunciation by the user of his needs for foreign military intelligence based on approved strategy.
- (2) (U) Validation of user needs for such intelligence based on objectives and priorities.
- (3) (U) Assessment of whether the needed foreign military intelligence is available within the U.S. intelligence community, or can be expected to become available as a result of programmed/budgeted resources, or scheduled production.
- (4) (U) Fermulation of a production program and assignment of production priorities and responsibilities to insure the production of intelligence which satisfies the validated needs of intelligence users.
- (5) (U) Production and dissemination of foreign military intelligence products based on information already available.
- (6) (U) Identification of the additional information to be collected, if available data is inadequate or incomplete, indicating items for priority collection and processing which are most needed for intelligence production purposes.
- (7) (U) Consolidation and validation of collection requirements.
- (8) (U) Allocation of collection tasks according to priorities and the specific capabilities of collection resources.

- (9) (U) Collection and reporting of required information.
- (10) (U) Processing and data reduction of selected collection information to make it more usuable to the production analyst and/or for storage in a data base.
- (11) (U) Transmittal of collected and processed information to appropriate production elements.
- (12) (U) Transformation of this data by consolidation, correlation, evaluation, analysis, and synthesis into finished foreign military intelligence products.
- (13) (U) Dissemination of such finished intelligence to appropriate intelligence users.
 - (14) (U) Evaluation of product utility by users.
- (15) (U) Review of product evaluations and intelligence cycle operations for system improvement.
- c. (U) The Defense Intelligence system, in actual operation, is an interrelated and complex process. It "meshing" effective of command, administrative, and intelligence processes to insure that requested Defense Intelligence is collected, processed, produced, and disseminated to authorized users at all echelons of the DoD and elsewhere in the U.S. Government. This requires proper training, assignment, and worldwide deployment of intelligence specialists of all types. Additionally, the acquisition and deployment of sophisticated collection, processing, communications, production, and technical support facilities are necessary to insure that the Defense Intelligence cycle satisfie**s** quantitatively qualitatively the requirements of all authorized users of Defense Intelligence.
- 4. (U) DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES:
- a. (U) The DoD. Executive Order 12036 assigns to the DoD the primary responsibilities within the U.S. Government for the collection and production of foreign military intelligence. This responsibility includes the collection and production of S&T and economic intelligence directly pertinent to DoD missions and requirements.
- b. (U) The Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and Chairman, JCS.

- (1) (U) The Secretary of Defense is by law the principal advisor to the President on national security. He participates in the development of national intelligence policy as a member of the NCS. In this position, the Secretary, along with other members of the NSC, receives advice and national intelligence from the DCI, who is the principal intelligence officer for the NSC. The Secretary of Defense and Chairman, JCS, by Presidential Executive Order, are members of the PRC and SCC of the NSC. In this capacity, they contribute to the formation of policy relating to foreign intelligence operations and evaluation of intelligence products.
- (2) (U) The Secretary of Defense, in accordance with Executive Order 12036, and by his departmental management authority, is responsible for the overall supervision and coordination of Defense Intelligence activities. He discharges his management and coordination responsibilities in this area through the ASD(C31), DUSD(PR), the Chairman, JCS, the DIA and NSA/CSS, and through the command channels of the Services and the U&S Commands. A Director of Net Assessment has also been established in OSD to integrate all DoD activities of this type and to insure a consolidated assessment of DoD strategy planning.
- c. (U) ASD(C³1). The ASD(C³1), as principal staff assistant to the Secretary of Defense for DoD communications, command and control, and intelligence resources (including related warning and reconnaissance activities) and as principal staff assistant in carrying out the responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense as Executive Agent of the NCS, has the following responsibilities for each of his assigned areas.
- (1) (U) Provide advice, make recommendations, and issue guidance on DoD plans, programs, and fiscal activities.
- (2) (U) Develop policies, systems and standards for the administration and management of approved plans and programs.
- (3) (U) Initiate and review programs and carry out approved policies.
- (4) (U) Review the quality and timeliness of products and their effectiveness for users.
- (5) (U) In conjunction with the ASD (Comptroller), review proposed programs and the resources required to implement them, formulate budget estimates, and recommend resource allocations.

- (6) (U) Monitor the implementation of approved programs, cooperation, and mutual understanding between the other Federal agencies.
- (7) (U) Participate in those planning, programming, and budgeting activities which relate to ASD(C3I) responsibilities.
- (8) (U) Exercise, subject to the direction of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, the latter's direction, authority and control over all research and development matters related to communications, command, control, and intelligence.
- (9) (U) Exercise direction, authority, and control over all DoD actions to allocate resources for intelligence activities, except those organic to combatant forces and those intelligence support activities specifically delegated to the JCS. Authority over the intelligence activities of the Military Departments will be exercised through the Secretary of the Military Department concerned.
- (10) (U) Serve on boards, committees, and other groups pertaining to his functional areas.
- (11) (U) Perform such other duties as the Secretary of Defense may prescribe.
- d. (U) DUSD(PR). DUSD(PR) has the following responsibilities for each of his assigned areas:
- (1) (U) Develop DoD communications and intelligence policy and means to verify response to policy.
- (2) (U) Confirm requirements for research, development and systems acquisition for intelligence analysis and production, intelligence collection and communications.
- (3) (U) In accordance with existing guidelines determine priorities for Defense Intelligence collection and establish guidelines for the assembly, integration and validation of all Defense intelligence requirements.
- (4) (U) Exercise staff supervision on policy matters over the DIA, the NSA, the Defense Mapping Agency, the Defense Communications Agency, Air Force and Navy special intelligence programs, Defense communications and intelligence functions retained by the Military Departments, and, in conjunction with the ASD (Comptroller), exercise the same supervision over

the Defense Investigative Service.

- (5) (U) Provide staff support for the Defense Intelligence Advisory Board.
- (6) (U) Conduct liaison with the Joint Staff and U&S Commands on policy matters related to his areas of responsibility.
- (7) (U) Develop DoD policy and requirements for use of space for matters related to his areas of responsibility.
- (8) (U) Provide to the ASD(C³I) requirements for intelligence and communications programs.
- (9) (U) Oversee DoD participation in sensitive intelligence matters, including contracts or arrangements with other countries; cooperate with the ASD(ISA) with respect to review of intelligence matters related to the NSC Special Coordination Committee.
- (10) (U) Provide policy guidance, oversight, and coordination for intelligence-related programs and issues to include counterintelligence and security policy.
- (11) (U) Participate in studies and analyses involving communications or intelligence policy matters and other matters as directed by the Secretary of Defense.
- (12) (U) Serve on boards, committees, and other groups pertaining to his functional areas.
- (13) (U) Perform such other duties as the Secretary of Defense may prescribe.
 - e. (U) The JCS.
- (1) (U) The JCS, supported by the Organization of the JCS (OJCS), constitute the military staff of the Secretary of Defense. To accomplish their responsibilities for advising and assisting the Secretary of Defense, the JCS are charged in DoD Directive 5100.1 "to provide adequate, timely, and reliable joint intelligence for use within the DoD." As the OJCS does not include a joint intelligence directorate (J-2), the DIA provides all required joint intelligence support to the JCS, as described in DoD Directive 5105.21.
- (2) (U) The JCS utilize the Director, DIA, as their primary agent and staff officer to carry out their military intelligence and counterintelligence functions.

The DIA also serves the JCS as the primary producer of Defense Intelligence for the development of intelligence guidance and estimates to support joint planning.

- (3) (U) The JCS review the Defense portion of the NFIP and related plans and programs to determine their impact on and support of stated military requirements. JCS recommendations for changes in NFIP intelligence resources are made to the Scarctary of Defense through ASD(C3I).
- f. (U) Defense Agencies. DIA and NSA are DoD intelligence organizations jointly manned by professional civilian personnel and military personnel of all the Services. The Directors of both agencies are active duty general or flag officers of at least three-star grade. They have broad managerial authority for tasking and resource review of Defense Intelligence activities which support their assigned missions.
- g. (U) The ASD(Comptroller). The ASD (Comptroller) is the principal staff assistant to the Secretary of Defense for programming, budgeting, auditing, and fiscal functions; for all matters pertaining to organization, management and administration; and for DoD investigative and security policies to include counterintelligence and security policies. He provides staff supervision for the Defense Contract Audit Agency and Defense Mapping Agency. In addition, he:
- (1) (U) Provides for the design and installation of resource management systems throughout the DoD.
- (2) (U) Collects, analyzes, and reports resource management information for the Secretary of Defense and as required for the OMB, the Congress, the General Accounting Office, and other agencies outside of the DoD.

h. (U) The Director, DIA.

(1) (U) The Director, DIA, is responsible for satisfying the foreign intelligence requirements of the Secretary of Defense, the JCS, the U&S Commands, DoD components, and other authorized agencies, and for providing the military intelligence contribution to national intelligence. The Director, DIA, serves as both the substantive intelligence advisor to the Secretary of Defense and the intelligence staff officer of the JCS. In these capacities, the Director, DIA, provides foreign intelligence and counterintelligence for military and defense purposes, supervises the DoD indications and warning (I&W) system, and coordinates, validates, and evaluates the satisfaction of all DoD intelligence

collection requirements. As program manager for the General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP) and as the DoD senior substantive voice for foreign intelligence matters, the Director, DIA, serves as a member of the NFIB. In this capacity, he advises the DCI concerning the NFIP budget and production, review, and coordination of national foreign intelligence.

- (2) (U) The Director, DIA, has broad authority for the following four basic management roles within the DoD:
- (a) (U) The principal military intelligence officer and advisor to the Secretary of Defense for all substantive foreign military intelligence matters.
- (b) (U) The coordinator of all collection and production of finished foreign military intelligence. In this role, he is responsive to all major users of Defense Intelligence.
- (c) (U) Responsible primarily to the Chairman, JCS, for providing foreign military intelligence, counterintelligence and related staff support to the Joint Staff and the U.S. military establishment.
 - (d) (U) Program Manager for the GDIP.
- (3) (U) The DIA has authority under DoD Directive 5105.21, to issue DoD-wide manuals or regulations governing collection, production, dissemination, integration, and evaluation of foreign military intelligence. This authority establishes DIA's key role in the Defense Intelligence Community. The impact of DIA management controls over general non-cryptologic military intelligence resources varies with different intelligence functional areas.
- (4) (U) For military S&T intelligence production, the DIA formulates DoD-wide program planning guidance and exercises comprehensive management control, although most S&T facilities are operated by the Services. For most other Defense Intelligence activities, the DIA validates collection and production requirements, tasks collectors, assigns priorities, and coordinates production schedules. On the other hand, DIA management authority over the intelligence staffs of Service headquarters and U&S Command headquarters is limited to review, coordination, and/or technical direction of those foreign military intelligence functions retained by the Services or assigned to those commands.

- (5) (U) The production of general intelligence within the DoD is accomplished by the Military Services, the U&S Commands, and DIA. The overall management of this program rests with the DIA. To fulfill its responsibility for developing a single DoD general intelligence production program, the DIA has established a production management system.
- (a) (U) This coordinated and mutually. supporting system consists of three parts: production management documentation, production management conferences and visits, and participation in the annual Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) cycle. The purpose of the documentation program is to provide an informational framework to facilitate sound decisions concerning the scope and direction of DoD general intelligence production. Specifically, management documentation is required: to review and coordinate the general intelligence production activities of the Commands and the Services; to support resource-related judgments; and to respond to queries (by oversight staffs) on the community's current and future intelligence production. The information and documentation maintained under this program focuses on the entire DoD production community. The Production Responsibilities Document (PRD) details the geographic and topical areas of responsibility of each DoD general intelligence production organization to serve as a basic reference on all DoD intelligence production. It is also designed to become a primary tool in justifying production resource requests and in tasking and scheduling the flow of intelligence production.
- (b) (U) The second basic document is the Defense Intelligence Production Schedule (DIPS) designed to provide an inventory of planned DoD general intelligence production. It is used by production managers for such actions as elimination of duplicative production, establishment of mutual supporting relationships and to advise collectors of future production tasks requiring collection action. The DIPS is also used by consumers to review programmed production, vis-a-vis their own needs, as a basis for identifying unsatisfied intelligence production requirements.
- (c) (U) Under procedures adopted by the October 1978 DoD General Intelligence Production Management Conference, the DIPS file will distinguish between products and files "endorsed" by DIA and those produced at local Command initiative. Further, the DIPS will be a primary means of establishing the degree to which the production effort satisfies a

priority intelligence need, is redundant or duplicative of other production, and is within the limits of the producer's responsibilities cited in the PRD.

- (d) (U) Under current procedures, each intelligence producer undertakes an active evaluation program of his DIPS production. Summary results of user surveys conducted under this program are provided to the DIA and are maintained as a discreet and privileged Production Evaluation File. The file is used to respond to Congressional queries on DoD wide production effectiveness and/or a basis for making resource judgments.
- (6) (U) The JCS charged DIA, in SM-262-62, 6 March 1962, with providing foreign military intelligence support to the U&S Commands. To accomplish this, the DIA operates mainly through the military chain of command, working with the intelligence staffs of the U&S Commands to improve their intelligence forces, to insure rapid exchange of intelligence, and to provide intercommand support arrangements. As necessary, such measures are submitted for approval by the commander-in-chief concerned and the DIA. Those measures requiring JCS approval are processed by DIA in its Joint Staff role in accordance with JCS procedures.
- (7) (U) The Director, DIA, has established a formal coordination mechanism, the Military Intelligence Board (MIB), so he can officially obtain Service advice and assistance in Defense Intelligence matters. He is the chairman of the MIB, whose members include the Service intelligence chiefs. MIB meetings are called by the DIA to discuss Defense Intelligence activities, problems, and estimates and to insure that all Service intelligence views are aired. Through this participative approach, the best possible intelligence advice can be presented to the Chairman, JCS, the Secretary of Defense, and the NFIB.
- (8) (U) A MIB subcommittee, generally referred to as the MIB Working Group, was established by the DIA in September 1974. The membership consists of senior officers or civilians from each of the Services as designated by the Service Intelligence Chiefs. The Assistant Deputy Director for Plans and Policy chairs the MIB Working Group. The working group provides a forum for addressing topics and problem areas of mutual concern to military intelligence in support of the MIB. It also provides a medium for rapid communication, problem definitions, solutions and coordination among the DIA and the Service intelligence organizations at the Sub-MIB level.

- (9) (U) JCS Publication 4, DIAM 49-1, and DIA publication RCC-2600-926-78 contain a summary of the duties and responsibilities of all DIA directorates and offices.
- (10) (U) The specific responsibilities of the Director, DIA, are:
- (a) (U) Produce, or through tasking and coordination, provide foreign intelligence for military and defense purposes, including political, economic and scientific and technical intelligence. This function includes the maintenance of a strong DoD scientific and technical intelligence program.
- (b) (U) Participate in the Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council process as established in DoD Directive 5000.2 by providing the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering with threat evaluations and threat validations based on information derived from coordinated intelligence.
- (c) (U) Supervise the DoD indications and warning (I&W) system and provide timely support to the Worldwide Military Command and Control System as well as appropriate military field commanders.
- (d) (U) Under policy and guidelines established by the DUSD(PR), coordinate all DoD intelligence collection and production requirements and validate, register, assign, recommend priorities for and evaluate the satisfaction of, DoD collection and production requirements, including those requirements assigned under the provisions of DoD Directive 5000.2.
- (e) (U) Maintain and operate a facility for the timely and interactive tasking of collection systems and capabilities in response to the time-urgent needs of the DoD.
- (f) (U) Assume primary responsibility for the day-to-day operations of the National Intelligence Tasking Center when transferred from the DCI to the Secretary of Defense, and maintain readiness for such transfer through regular practice.
- (g) (U) Manage the Defense Attache System (DAS).
- (h) (U) Participate in joint national and Defense Intelligence activities such as the National Photographic Interpretation Center, the National Intelligence Tasking Center, the Defense Special Missile and Astronautics Center and other such activities as

may be developed by mutual inter-agency agreement and approved by the Secretary of Defense.

- (i) (U) In coordination with other intelligence agencies concerned, recommend plans for intelligence operations, including plans for the use of national intelligence systems to support military operational commanders.
- (j) (U) As directed, coordinate the execution of approved intelligence operation plans.
- (k) (U) Act as manager for all aspects of Defense Intelligence production within the GDIP and recommend changes in the application of current and new collection systems or improvements in DoD intelligence collection systems and related collection systems to the DUSD(PR) and the ASD(C³I).
- (1) (U) Serve as Program Manager for the GDIP.
- (m) (U) Manage such other intelligence programs as may be designated by the Secretary of Defense.
- (n) (U) Coordinate for the OSD and the JCS, Defense collection, production and analysis of information concerning the international terrorist threat to U.S. forces, installations, and nuclear weapons facilities.
- (o) (U) Establish, maintain and operate facilities for DoD imagery indexing, processing, duplication, evaluation, exploitation and central repository services in support of DoD and other authorized recipients.
- (p) (U) Supervise a DoD-wide intelligence dissemination program and provide centralized dissemination services in support of DoD and other authorized recipients.
- (q) (U) Operate the Defense Intelligence School.
- (r) (U) Maintain a central repository for all DoD intelligence reporting and provide intelligence bibliography, reference library, and research services.
- (s) (U) Exercise management authority for all DoD intelligence information systems and related intelligence telecommunications systems except those systems dedicated to SIGINT operations and support

functions falling within the scope of DoD Directive S-3115.7.

- (t) (U) Operate a DoD-wide career development program for civilian general intelligence personnel and review, coordinate and evaluate the career development program for military general intelligence personnel; conduct planning and guidance activities in coordination with DoD components on these programs to meet DoD requirements. Provide technical assistance in the development, and monitor and evaluate the conduct of, DoD general intelligence training.
- (u) (U) Provide guidance to DoD components concerning the release of Defense Intelligence information to foreign governments, international organizations, and the public.
- (v) (U) Provide representation on national and international intelligence committees, boards and working groups, as appropriate.
- (w) (U) Provide the DoD focal points for relationships and exchanges with foreign intelligence services except as exempted by the DUSD(PR). The DIA will coordinate new proposals for relationships and exchanges with the DUSD(PR). Maintain a central registry of all DoD intelligence agreements with foreign services.
- (x) (U) Establish and conduct or recommend, research, development, test and evaluation programs or projects to carry out the responsibilities assigned.
- (y) (U) Administer assigned DoD security policies and programs to protect intelligence and intelligence sources and methods, including direction of the Defense Special Security System. This responsibility will not apply to programs of the NSA, or other programs exempted by the Secretary of Defense.
- (z) (U) Adjudicate clearance eligibility for DIA civilian personnel and eligibility for access to compartmented intelligence for all personnel assigned to OSD, OJCS, and the Defense agencies, with the exception of NSA, including contractors and consultants.
- (aa) (U) Perform such other functions and services as the Secretary of Defense may assign.

i. (U) The Director, NSA.

- (1) (U) The function of the NSA is to conduct SIGINT activities and COMSEC activities for the U.S. Government, to provide an effective unified organization for the conduct and control of the SIGINT activities and COMSEC activities of the United States, and for formulating and promulgating operational plans, policies, and procedures for such activities. The unified organization is the U.S. SIGINT system, the purpose of which is to meet the needs for national, departmental, and tactical SIGINT.
 - (2) (U) The functions of the NSA are carried out under the direct supervision and control of the Secretary of Defense, who must comply with intelligence and COMSEC policies, needs, and priorities established by the NSC. This is done through the Director, NSA/Chief, CSS, who is charged in DoD Directives, S-5100.20 and S-3115.7 with general management of SIGINT and COMSEC activities.

(3) (U) The Director, NSA will:

- (a) (U) Establish and operate an effective unified organization for SIGINT activities, except for the delegation of operational control over certain operations that are conducted through other elements of the Intelligence Community. No department or agency other than NSA may engage in SIGINT activities except pursuant to a delegation by the Secretary of Defense.
- (b) (U) Control SIGINT collection and processing activities, including assignment of resources to an appropriate agent for such periods and tasks as required for the direct support of military commanders.
- (c) (U) Collect SIGINT information for national foreign intelligence purposes in accordance, with tasking by the NITC.
- (d) (U) Process SIGINT data for national foreign intelligence purposes consistent with standards for timeliness established by the DCI.
- (e) (U) Disseminate SIGINT information for national foreign intelligence purposes to authorized elements of the Government, including the Military Services in accordance with guidance from the NITC.
- (f) (U) Collect, process, and disseminate SIGINT information for counterintelligence purposes.

- (g) (U) Provide SIGINT support for the conduct of military operations in accordance with tasking, priorities and standards of timeliness assigned by the Secretary of Defense. If provision of such support requires use of national collection systems, these systems will be tasked within existing guidance from the DCI.
- (h) (U) Execute the responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense as executive agent for the COMSEC of the U.S. Government.
- (i) (U) Conduct R&D to meet needs of the United States for SIGINT and COMSEC.
- (j) (U) Protect the security of NSA installations, activities, information and personnel by appropriate means including such investigations of applicants, employees, contractors and other persons with similar associations with the NSA as are necessary.
- (k) (U) Prescribe, within the field of authorized operations, security regulations covering operating practices, including the transmission, handling and distribution of SIGINT and COMSEC material within and among the elements under his control and exercise the necessary supervisory control to insure compliance with regulations.
- (1) (U) Serve as program manager for the Consolidated Cryptologic Program (CCP), which is part of the NFIF, and manage such other programs as designated by the Secretary of Defense.
- (m) (U) Act as the functional director, under the ASD(C³I) for developing DoD career development programs for military and civilian cryptologic personnel.

The NSA/CSS is the U.S. Government's primary collector and processor of communications intelligence (COMINT) on foreign nations and activities, the primary processor

the primary coordinator of all DoD electronics intelligence (ELINT) collection activities, and the final authority for all U.S. Government cryptographic systems, equipment, and procedures. The NSA either supervises, or conducts the processing of all COMINT, and some ELINT data, but does not produce finished intelligence from processed SIGINT. The Director, NSA/Chief, CSS, also conducts those SIGINT operations which directly support electronic warfare (EW).

of intelligence support to the Military Departments staffs, agencies, and subordinate commands.

(2) (U) The Military Departments are charged in accordance with DoD Directive 5100.1 to "provide adequate, timely and reliable departmental intelligence for use within the DoD." These responsibilities are primarily fulfilled by the respective Military Services for their Departments. DoD Directive 5100.1 tasks the Army and the Air Force to "provide an organization capable of furnishing adequate, timely, and reliable intelligence for each respective Service. The Directive also states that a primary function of the Navy and Marine Corps is to "furnish adequate, timely and reliable intelligence for the Navy and Marine Corps." In this manner, the intelligence responsibilities of the Departments and Services support their broad, statutory missions.

The Services are primary producers of technical intelligence for themselves, the DIA, and other components of the DoD. A major responsibility of each Service, unique to each Service, is to relate intelligence programs to operational support of each type of combat force. The current edition of the Armed Forces Staff College (AFSC) instructional manual, "Intelligence for Joint Forces," AFSC Pub 5, contains a current summary of the major intelligence organizations of each Service. Current Service directives and regulations contain the authoritative responsibilities of the various Service intelligence organizations.

- (4) (U) Coordination of intelligence activities in the Services is exercised through Service chiefs of intelligence. Each Service intelligence chief is responsible to his Service Chief for supervision of Service worldwide resources. Another primary responsibility of each Service intelligence chief is the contribution to the annual departmental portions of the GDIP, including Service intelligence activities of components of the U&S Commands.
- (5) (U) Within constraints, Service intelligence staffs prepare finished intelligence reports and studies for internal use, particularly to develop Service positions for NFIB or JCS deliberation. Service intelligence staffs and agerties use DIA, CIA, or State Department finished intelligence as well as their own reports for a variety of Service planning, programming

j. (U) Military Departments/Services.

(1) (U) The role of the Military Departments derives from the statutory departmental missions. These include, primarily, preparing forces for conduct of war and providing personnel, logistic, and administrative support to the combatant commands. Accordingly, the primary intelligence role of the Military Departments is similarly to organize, train, and equip intelligence forces for assignment to the combatant commands, and to conduct those intelligence functions which peculiarly relate to departmental missions. Included is the development and support of intelligence systems and the provision

and/or operational purposes. Service intelligence representatives from these staffs and agencies participate regularly in DoD, Joint or other intelligence activities, including membership on DCI committees and subcommittees.

- (6) (U) The Military Departments provide the tactical and other intelligence and counterintelligence resources for the component commands. However, these resources are authorized only after the appropriate DoD programming and budgeting decisions have been made on Service recommendations. Resources are procured through Service channels. The Military Departments also furnish trained and experienced military intelligence personnel for joint staff duty in the DIA, NSA/CSS, and the U&S Commands.
- (7) (U) Specific intelligence responsibilities of the Military Departments and Services are listed below.
- (a) (U) Organize, train, and equip intelligence and counterintelligence units and personnel for assignment to combatant commands, departmental elements, and other components of the DoD. Provide for the continued support of such units and personnel.
- (b) (U) Develop intelligence doctrines and techniques, and plan and develop tactical intelligence systems, as required, for support of the combatant forces.
- (c) (U) Provide military intelligence training and advisory assistance to selected foreign countries in accordance with approved programs.
- (d) (U) Establish and administer career development programs for military and civilian intelligence personnel, guided by the Intelligence Career Development Program (ICDP).
- (e) (U) Develop and procure intelligence equipment and supplies, and conduct the research, development, testing, and evaluation (RDT&E) incident thereto, as authorized.
- (f) (U) Develop, establish, and support the Service segments of the DoD Intelligence Information System (DODIIS) in accordance with approved policies and procedures.
- (g) (U) Conduct counterintelligence operations for the protection of worldwide departmental and Service activities and other DoD activities, as required.

- (h) (U) Conduct operations to collect intelligence information and develop collection resources in accordance with approved programs.
- (i) (U) Conduct SIGINT and acoustical intelligence (ACOUSTINT) operations in accordance with applicable directives.
- (j) (U) Produce S&T intelligence and other special finished intelligence products directly related to departmental missions under tasking or other appropriate management supervision of the DIA.
- (k) (U) Produce finished counterintelligence products under tasking of the DIA or other appropriate management supervision.
- (1) (U) Receive finished intelligence and collate, interpret, adapt, and present it to departmental consumers in the form required to satisfy their needs and in support of particular forces and weapon systems development requirements.
- (m) (U) Provide, at appropriate levels of command, intelligence staff support as required, including intelligence staff support to the Chief of Service in his capacity as a member of the JCS.
- (n) (U) Operate the departmental components of DoD systems for protective handling and dissemination of special intelligence materials, in accordance with applicable directives.
- (o) (U) In conformance with DoD Directive 5100.1, develop and administer an integrated system for the Military Departments' intelligence and counterintelligence activities.

k. (U) U&S Commands.

(1) (U) The operational intelligence role of the U&S Commands is to insure the availability of foreign military intelligence necessary to support the command mission. Related responsibilities are to insure necessary counterintelligence measures to protect their commands; to exercise "operational command" and thus, guidance, over the intelligence activities of their component commands, subordinate unified commands, and task forces; and to satisfy the intelligence collection and reporting requirements of higher authority. The intelligence chiefs of the U&S to responsible Commands are commanders-in-chief for command-wide intelligence planning for support of the command's operational missions. This requires integration and coordination of

most Defense Intelligence operations in command's theater of operations. The U&S Commanders are not formally involved in the annual programming and budgeting for component command intelligence resources. However, the program managers informally request their views. While the Services furnish trained intelligence manpower and financial support for the component command intelligence activities, the operating policies of these components emanate from the U&S Commander through his intelligence staff, which prepares intelligence reports or studies for command wide use, within the limits of available resources. In most cases, DIA, CIA or State Department finished intelligence is combined with internally produced data for this purpose. See enclosure 1, Chart 3 for the intelligence organization of a typical U&S Command.

Much of the

current intelligence used by the joint commander in support of his operations, is produced by DoD intelligence activities. See AFSC Pub 5 for detailed discussion of joint intelligence operations involving joint planning, estimates, collection, production, use of computers, etc. Doctrine on joint intelligence is contained in JCS Publication 2.

- (3) (U) Specified intelligence responsibilities of the U&S Commands are listed below.
- (a) (U) Conduct foreign military intelligence collection and production operations, in order to accomplish the command mission and to satisfy the intelligence requirements on the command by higher authority.
- (b) (U) Insure that the necessary counterintelligence measures are taken to protect the command.
 - (c) (U) In conformance with DIA guidance,

develop and administer supporting integrated intelligence planning and management systems.

- (d) (U) Produce finished foreign military intelligence, as required, to execute command missions; levy on higher authority or other commands requirements for finished intelligence which cannot be met by resources within the command.
- (c) (U) Participate in the DoD Indications and Warning Systems.
- (f) (U) Review, validate, and levy collection requirements on subordinate commands; levy on higher authority or other commands those validated command collection requirements which cannot be met by collection resources within the command.
- (g) (U) Conduct collection operations and manage, as required, the collection operations of subordinate commands.
- (h) (U) Develop, establish, and manage the DODIIS within the command.
- (i) (U) Insure that intelligence and counterintelligence support is furnished to subordinate elements of the command.
 - (j) (U) Participate in the DoD-wide ICDP.
 - 1. (U) Component Commands.
- (1) (U) U&S Command intelligence resources are primarily assigned to the individual Service component commands. These serve in tactical or operational needs, e.g., the war or contingency planning requirements, of the component commanders as well as the needs of the U&S Commanders. These specific Service resources consist of a variety of intelligence units,

Joint intelligence centers exist in some theaters for special intelligence processing and production. Intelligence staffs, counterintelligence, and investigative activities exist in component compands in accordance with assigned missions. Component command intelligence resources are programmed and budgeted through appropriate Military Department channels in accordance with prescribed PPB procedures. Most of the component intelligence output serves not only its own needs but also the intelligence requirements of the U&S Commander involved, and

to a degree, certain national needs.

Tactical intelligence units at a component or subcommand level normally remain under the control of the component commanders. Such operational control is essential to accomplish assigned tactical missions and to insure that these units are immediately responsive to the tactical commander in emergencies or combat

also play a role in the development of national intelligence.

At the same time, these units must continue to provide the required data for normal command intelligence operations.

Continuous intelligence and operations coordination is essential in tactical operations and in all operational commands. At these levels, planning for intelligence production and related collection by the commander's staff must be tailored to tactical (operations) objectives and priorities. Conduct of intelligence operations at the tactical level must directly support the tactical commander's immediate needs.

in addition to satisfying the tactical commanders immediate needs, much current military intelligence may be produced, as operational capability allows, which satisfies other intelligence requirements.

5. (U) DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONS AND OPERATIONS:

a. Basic Procedures. The Defense Intelligence Community has established procedures to insure effective supervision of Defense Intelligence functions and operations. Working relationships have been developed among the OSD, DIA, NSA, the Services, and the U&S Commands which have resulted in

b. Identification of User Needs. (Information Requirements). The initial step in the operation of the intelligence cycle is the identification of specific user information needs.

c. (U) Intelligence Collection.

(1) Collection operations are conducted in

response to validated requirements for the production of finished foreign military intelligence.

beings as collectors of information, documents, and equipment. Collectors may be within or outside the Intelligence Community. Included are the military attaches, the Services, and components of the U&S Commands.

- (b) Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) collection results in a record of likeness of the target on sensitized material, particularly photographic inaterial, which is interpreted and processed for intelligence use.
 - (c) (U) SIGINT collection consists of:
- 1. (U) COMINT collection, the intercept of foreign communications from which technical and intelligence information is derived, does not include the monitoring of foreign public media or the intercept of communications obtained during the course of counterintelligence investigations within the United States. The NSA/CSS, with support from the Military Services, is responsible for the execution of COMINT collection programs.
- 2. (U) ELINT collection, the collection of foreign noncommunications electromagnetic radiations from other than nuclear detonations or radioactive sources and from which technical and intelligence information is derived, is executed by national level resources, the NSA/CSS, the Services, the U&S Commands and their components.
- 3. (U) TELINT collection, the intercept of foreign telemetry, which is processed and analyzed to obtain technical and intelligence information is a subcategory of foreign instrumentation signals intelligence.
- (d) (U) Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT) collection results in S&T intelligence information obtained by quantitative and qualitative analysis of data

derived from specific technical sensors for the purpose of identifying any distinctive features associated with the source, emitter, or sender, and to facilitate subsequent identification and/or measurement of the same. The term MASINT is not intended to replace the established terms when referring to the specific disciplines, but will be used only when referring to the broad category of special sensor disciplines.

- (4) (U) The basic DoD intelligence collection systems currently in use are described below.
 - (a) (U) HUMINT collection uses human

- (5) (U) DIAM 58-2, "Defense Intelligence Collection Requirements Manual (DIRM)," is the basic DoD authority for Defense Intelligence worldwide collection operations. It contains an explanation of the collection requirements management system and related procedures. The DIRM identifies in broad terms all subjects of military interest for collection planning and operations.
 - d. (U) Information Processing.
- (1) Intelligence information and data processing embraces those activities which are necessary to reduce collected information to readable text, or to a form suitable for analytical exploitation or storage in an intelligence data base.

- e. (U) Types of Intelligence Products.
- (1) (U) Intelligence production is normally based on the correlation and analysis of all available information collected and processed by methods just described. The final intelligence products are as objective, accurate and timely as possible to serve user needs. Such production includes a wide range of geographic and functional topics based on approved intelligence objectives and priorities, or on special requirements of current crisis situations.
- (2) Finished intelligence may take many forms. It can be prepared as summaries for verbal briefings to DoD officials and senior military commanders, as formatted reports for electrical

transmission, as additions to intelligence data bases or as detailed and comprehensive studies and estimates.

trends of foreign military forces and weapons systems.

limitations, possible courses of action, and future

f. (U) Intelligence Production and Reporting.

(1) (U) Requests for both general and S&T finished intelligence are normally validated by the DIA. Requests to the DIA for Defense Intelligence come from throughout the DoD, but also from many other governmental departments, the White House staff or from committees of the Congress which deal with national security matters. To fulfill such repetitive or continuing requirements, specific intelligence products are programmed by the DIA. These intelligence products, including those produced at all echelons, are periodically reviewed to insure that they continue to be responsive to validated intelligence requirements and are not substantively duplicative.

- (2) (U) The DoD Intelligence Community receives guidance concerning DoD user requirements through the Key Intelligence Requirements (KIR) program. The KIR's are those military intelligence requirements which surface as most critical to decisionmakers for the formulation of policy and decisions in the area of national security. The purpose of the KIR's is to anticipate, identify, and address critical defense-related intelligence requirements and to provide specific intelligence questions for the DoD needed to focus collection and production efforts, create audit trails of requirements, efforts, products and user satisfaction, and evaluate the DoD Intelligence Community performance.
- (a) (U) In order to provide more explicit guidance concerning intelligence efforts for the foreseeable future, the JCS issues the Intelligence Priorities for Strategic Planning (IPSP), which identifies countries and military intelligence requirements of interest to the United States and is the basic guide for the assignment of priorities to DoD intelligence production and collection. In the development of this document, several documents which provide official expressions of strategy and/or intelligence needs are considered. These include the DCID 1/2, the U.S. Intelligence Community's national objectives and priorities document; Annex A, Intelligence, Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), which contains intelligence tasks and planning guidance for the U&S Commands for the oncoming fiscal year; Annex A, Intelligence, of the Joint Strategic Planning Document (JSPD), which covers the 8 mid-range years and documents the JCS and U&S Command intelligence needs; selected intelligence estimates; and the Unified Command Plan (UCP). The DIA, as the primary

Finished

intelligence consists of several general functional categories, as discussed in the next paragraph. For clarity, it is desirable to consider finished intelligence products in these categories, rather than in terms of levels of use, e.g., national, strategic, factical, or operations. Some of these terms are defined in enclosure 2 due to usage elsewhere. In general, however, most of these and related terms define types of intelligence products which can be broadly included in the initial categories discussed below:

- (3) (U) Four distinct categories of foreign military intelligence are normally produced within the Defense Intelligence Community, having products in a variety of formats, with different details of coverage and varying reporting frequencies, all keyed to user needs. These categories are:
- (a) (U) Current military intelligence usually concise, brief, and timely studies or reports on significant foreign military and related activities, "time-critical" indications of significant existing or impending foreign military trends, activities or threats, or counterintelligence reports.
- (b) (U) Basic military intelligence-covering the widest spectrum of information such as order of battle, target data, biographic data, regional studies, economic, politico-military, insurgency, terrorism, military geography, counterintelligence, and other encyclopedic categories.
- (c) (U) Military S&T intelligence-which in udes specific studies of developmental work on foreign weapons systems and materiel and their associated operational performance and technical characteristics, countermeasure techniques, nuclear energy programs and weapon trends (including stockpiles), electronic warfare capabilities, R&D activities and trends, technical aspects of multi-system operations, developments in basic applied sciences and technologies with warfare potential.
- (d) (U) Military intelligence estimates which include assessments of foreign military capabilities,

military intelligence producer and/or coordinator, uses the IPSP as a means of guiding intelligence activities for the oncoming years, principally those concerning production and collection tasking, and related support functions. Through this process, improved production schedules can be developed, more explicit and timely collection actions can be programmed, and the quality of intelligence reporting can be more closely aligned with consumers' needs.

- (b) (U) In implementing portions of the IPSP, the DIA annually updates three production plans which list the major intelligence products to be produced by all Defense activities. Two of these plans, DIPS, for general intelligence, and Counterintelligence Publication Registry (CIPR), prescribe who is to produce what and when in the area of general intelligence. The CIPR also lists available counterintelligence products. S&T intelligence is produced in accordance with a Service coordinated, DIA-approved DoD schedule covering current and projected fiscal year production. This schedule is 'maintained by quarterly updates in response to Service inputs. A complete listing of current, valid S&T intelligence products is maintained in the Scientific and Technical Intelligence Register (STIR) which is published semi annually. Entries contained in the STIR include anticipated dates of scheduled revisions for each product.
- (c) (U) Two DIA manuals provide guidance, policy and procedures for DoD-wide military intelligence production. DIAM 57-1, "General Intelligence Production (U)," CONFIDENTIAL. establishes policies for the processing and production of all DoD finished general intelligence. It contains data on general intelligence production management, standardization, numbering of intelligence subject publications, production scheduling, reporting formats and related guidance information. This manual also contains organizational charts of Defense Intelligence production facilities in the Military Services and U&S Commands, current Defense Intelligence production responsibilities of these organizations, as well as the DIA/CIA division of responsibilities for overall U.S. national level intelligence production. DIAM 75-1, "Scientific and Technical Intelligence Production (U)," CONFIDENTIAL, describes the DIA S&T production management system and sets forth the assigned responsibilities of DoD components in the system. This manual outlines the major elements of the system; i.e., production management structure, production program procedure, management data reporting, information services, foreign materiel exploitation and use of related technical sensor data. These manuals are issued

periodically under the authority of DoD Directive 5105.21.

Intelligence is to insure the immediate reporting to the National Command Authorities (NCA) of indications and warning of the imminence of hostilities. Worldwide Defense indications systems, with warning centers at various echelons, have been established to insure the most rapid reporting of such critical intelligence to the President, the Secretary of Defense, the JCS, and other U.S. governmental decisionmakers. This type of intelligence is processed, evaluated, and reported by highly-skilled and experienced Defense Intelligence personnel at various warning centers in a matter of minutes.

(4) Finished intelligence is normally reported by the most rapid means considered essential to insure that the intelligence reaches the required user at the time specified or according to an established schedule (even hourly, if required, during crises or emergencies). Defense intelligence analysts at all levels try to santicipate information that is going to be needed.

The DIA and other DoD intelligence producers will "automatically" initiate continuous or periodic reporting to intelligence users when the situation so requires.

(5) The actual operations of the Defense Intelligence worldwide production and reporting system are complex and integrated with related operational command and control system. The entire integrated system is directly responsive not only to the NCA but also to all other U.S. governmental officials who need current Defense Intelligence to aid their daily activities and their decisionmaking.

(a) Defense Intelligence products are used by DoD representatives during NSC, NFIB, and other meetings, and during crises. The DIA provides a range of military intelligence estimates, services, and products to the White House, Defense, and military decisionmakers on an hourly or daily basis during crisis periods.

(H)

Defense Attache

Unices (DAO's) are to be directed, operated, and maintained by the DIA to collect and report military and political military intelligence, to provide representational services, to accomplish certain security assistance functions and to serve their assigned IIS ambassadors as requested and required

- (e) (U) Defense Attaches are diplomatically accredited, overtly-assigned, professional U.S. military representatives who are permanently stationed in most foreign capitals. They are unique elements of the DoD intelligence collection system and are in regular personal contact with foreign military officers and officials of friendly, neutral, and potentially hostile countries. Defense Attaches, usually senior military officers, provide Defense, State Department, and other U.S. Government officials with rapid and unique "first-hand" reporting on assigned countries, as well as providing direct advice and assistance to their "country team" chiefs, the resident U.S. Ambassadors. Defense Attaches represent, simultaneously in many cases, the DoD, the JCS, and their respective Services to their host government's military establishment. In many cases the attaches are the only U.S. Defense or Service representatives in particular countries or regions, and must provide U.S. official representational services and functions on behalf of the Secretary of Defense, the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the Chairman and members of the JCS, the Chiefs of the Services, and the Commanders of U&S Commands. as well as perform a variety of assigned Defense Intelligence collection tasks.
- (6) (U) Each Military Service has S&T intelligence production activities which come under the direct management authority of the Director, DIA. Under this centralized management system, the Military Services and other DoD components submit current and foreseeable needs for foreign military S&T and related intelligence products. These production requirements are then reviewed, validated, and assigned priorities. The majority are tasked to the Service S&T production elements by the DIA. These tasking assignments are based on assigned areas of responsibilities. In this manner, most of the S&T products prepared by the Services are developed to satisfy DoD-wide intelligence requirements in all military S&T areas.

F. (7)

The DIA has the responsibility for tasking, coordinating, and monitoring the production of counterintelligence. Counterintelligence and other special products directly related to departmental missions are produced and distributed directly to departmental users and planners is well as to other

appropriate echelons throughout Describe Intelligence.

(8) With some exceptions, foreign military intelligence produced at DoD (DIA) echelons must be supplemented by local production at operational echelons in order to satisfy the detail of reporting required by a particular command. This requirement for local production normally increases down the echelons of command, commensurate with increasing needs for detail, timeliness, and special orientation to local situations. At the tactical level, commanders are necessarily heavily dependent on their own staffs and other assigned resources for immediate production of intelligence to support ongoing operations.

- g. (U) Intelligence Support Functions. In addition to the basic functions which comprise the primary intelligence process of collection, processing, production, and dissemination, there are certain functions which contribute to this process and which are integral elements of the Defense Intelligence system. These include:
- (1) DODIIS. The system is comprised of the information handling facilities, equipment, and personnel of the DIA, the U&S Commands, their components and the Military Services supporting the Defense Intelligence Mission.

system provides analytical tools and techniques for the efficient manipulation, storage, and retrieval of intelligence and is specifically designed to serve

individual intelligence analysts and managers in the performance of their functions

collection, and production efforts. Central management control and/or guidance of such intelligence support systems in the DoD is essential to assure economical and responsive document service.

(3) (U) Intelligence Career Development and Training. The increasing complexity and technical nature of intelligence today requires highly qualified, experienced, technically-oriented and dedicated personnel, both military and civilian. Sound career development programs are vital to develop and maintain a core of such personnel and provide assignments for them throughout Defense Intelligence. Basic intelligence courses are conducted by the Services and all authorized military personnel. The CIA conducts all clandestine training for military departments, and the Air Force provides formal training in imagery interpretation. Such joint training is coordinated, monitored, and evaluated by the DIA. The Defense Intelligence School, as a JCS-chartered institution, is responsible for the professional intelligence training of all DoD personnel in the joint intelligence area. The DIA, through its Defense Intelligence School, provides senior and graduate intelligence training for both military and civilian

personnel. The NSA, similarly, provides several courses for training personnel in cryptology. Other specialized courses are authorized for Defense Intelligence training needs. This intelligence training, supplemented by other college graduate-level and National and Service college education, are prerequisites to developing the highest caliber of professional personnel for duty with Defense Intelligence. In accordance with DoD Directive 5101.10, DIA reviews and coordinates the ICDP for military general intelligence personnel cryptologic) and similarly is the executive agent for establishing a DoD-wide ICDP for non-cryptologic civilian intelligence personnel to provide opportunities for education, training, rotation, and promotion equal to their contemporaries in other career fields.

(4) (U) Intelligence R&D.

The development, validation, and full financial support of creative Defense Intelligence RDT&E programs are essential to insure the continued future effectiveness of collection, production, and reporting systems of Defense Intelligence.

- (b) (U) The Intelligence Resource and Development Council explores new directions and techniques in both the "hard" and "soft" sciences which hold promise for intelligence and which should receive program support and application. It maintains a continuing knowledge of the allocation and uses of R&D resources related to intelligence, and advises the Chairman, Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee, (IRAC) on R&D strategy and technology that will best contribute to the attainment of national intelligence objectives.
- 6. (U) RELATIONS BETWEEN DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS.
 - a. (U) Private Contractor Organizations.
- (1) (U) Relations between DoD intelligence components and private contractors involving the release of classified intelligence material are governed by NFIB policy.
- (2) (U) If contractors for governmental agencies, who are not DoD components nor members of NFIB, require access to classified DoD intelligence, requests for approval will be forwarded from the contracting government agency to:
- (a) (U) The Military Department concerned if an agreement has been entered into between the governmental agency and the department.
 - (b) (U) The DIA in all other cases.
- b. (U) Other U.S. Agencies and Departments.
 Relations between DoD intelligence organizations and other U.S. agencies or departments outside the U.S. Intelligence community are determined by pertinent DoD and DCI directives governing the use and dissemination of intelligence materials.

- c. (U) Foreign Governments and International Organizations.
- (1) (U) Relations between the DoD intelligence activities and those of foreign governments and international organizations arise by virtue of Defense and/or mutual assistance treaties or through official executive arrangements. Such relations are conducted by various echelons of the DoD, but are, in all cases, subject to review and coordination by the DIA and approval by the Office of Secretary of Defense.

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

1. (U) GENERAL:

- a. (U) The complexity and varied responsibilities of the Defense Intelligence Community, together with the reality of increasingly limited resources, require an integrated management system controlling all DoD intelligence activities. To achieve this, improved planning, programming, and evaluation of products and services must be accomplished. These management activities are affected by a variety of influences such as U.S. national goals, changing military strategy and objectives, financial constraints and the expected military threats to the United States and its interests. Development of realistic intelligence resource programs and operational intelligence capabilities by Defense Intelligence management system.
- b. (U) An important aspect of the Defense Intelligence management system is the interrelationship between planning, programming, and budgeting (PPB) for development of future intelligence resources and the use of available resources to satisfy present intelligence operational requirements. The planning and programming for most Defense Intelligence future resources are performed by senior DoD, DIA, and NSA program managers in close coordination with intelligence officials of the Services. On the other hand, most operational Defense Intelligence collection, processing, and some production activities are carried out by military commands which must be responsive to the military chain of command. To insure compatibility, there must be close coordination between the planners and the programmers and the current operational managers. Thus, intelligence officials and military commanders at all levels must have a continuing voice in their intelligence requirements and in the products and services developed in their behalf.

2. (U) DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE PLANNING:

- a. (U) Coordinated Planning.
- (1) Coordinated planning of all Defense Intelligence activities is essential to reaching Defense Intelligence goals.

Since Defense

Intelligence supports military planning based on national policy and strategy, it must be keyed to national and Defense goals and objectives.

(2) (U) This planning system, in some respects, parallels but does not duplicate required Defense Intelligence support for JCS planning. It is designed to integrate all Defense Intelligence planning to maintain the capability to simultaneously and directly support the President, the NSC, other national intelligence requirements, the Secretary of Defense, as well as the JCS. This planning system is designed to insure the most efficient allocation of Defense Intelligence resources to achieve the somewhat differing NSC and JCS requirements. The Defense Intelligence planning system will include internal evaluation mechanism for collection, production, and reporting accountability to insure a viable management

system, responsive directly to approved goals, objectives and related priorities.

- b. Estimates Basis for Planting. The basic national defense strategy of the United States, as developed by the DoD for the NSC and approved by the President, must be built upon the framework of good Defense estimative intelligence.
- d. (U) Long Range Intelligence Planning.
- (1) Long-range Defense planning by the U.S. Government is largely dependent upon a systematically-updated Defense Intelligence data base on military and related political and economic activities of the selected nations and regions of the world.

- c. (U) JCS Strategic Planning Periods. Defense estimative intelligence is the foundation for the basic military contribution to the President's national strategy. This is reflected in the DoD FYDP which is prepared annually through the DoD PPB system. These essimates are formally published in the variety of joint blans and studies in accordance with the ICS Joint Strategic' Planning System (JSPS), a structured, annually updated planning system prescribed in JCS Memorandum-of Pelicy 84 (MOP-84): The JSP includes the Joint Long Range - Strategic Study (ILRSS) and i- the Joint Long Range - Estimative Intelligence Document (JLREID) for the long-range planning period. These documents will be replaced in 1980 by the Joint Long-Range Strategic Appraisal (JLRSA); covering estimative intelligence; U.S. strategic forecasts, broad force structuring implications, and probable issues in the period from 20 to 20 years in the future; the mid-range Joint Strategic Planning Document (JSPD), which provides anterest and objectives worldwide, a statement of recommended military objectives derived from national. objectives, and the recommended military strategy, required to attain national objectives in the mid-range period; and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plant
- R&D needs for this period are to be published in the JILRSA. It will summarize trends of world power relationships in the long-range period, including estimates on the expected capabilities of foreign nations to take actions which could adversely affect U.S. national interests.
- (3) Defense Intelligence forecasts are required on a continuing basis to support DoD and JCS long-range planning.

- (4) Providing intelligence support for the Defense system process is a joint undertaking by the Services and DIA. Long-range projections of the threat will generally extend over the anticipated operational lifetime of the U.S. systems.
- (2) JCS planners concerned with mid-range force planning largely depend on Defense Intelligence for the data they need for this purpose. Future U.S. Forces have to be planned with the knowledge that intelligence is never complete or entirely accurate.
- e. (U) Mid-Range Intelligence Planning.
- (1) Joint Defense Intelligence estimates are continually prepared by DIA to describe the interrelated military, political, and economic trends that may affect U.S. national interests in the forthcoming 10 years. These estimates are based on intelligence from the DIA, the Services, and the U&S Commands.

(4) Defense Intelligence mid-range planning, itself, is primarily concerned with identification and selection of future resources, which must be programmed several years in advance.

(5) (U) Realistic resource planning programming for the mid-range period must occur every year, building upon PPB actions and decisions of previous years and laying the foundation for later budgeting for actual intelligence capabilities for current use. In this phase, Defense Intelligence mid-range requirements and priorities are translated into the types and costs of intelligence resources it is anticipated will be needed in the short-range period. This results in decisions to request specific collection, production, and related support resources believed required to obtain the desired information, to process it, and then to produce the required intelligence. Great care must be exercised in the programming phase. Future needs for intelligence cannot be met if required resources are not carefully programmed, fully funded, or procured. Additionally, personnel must be properly trained and equipped in time to be deployed within, the periods required by the President's strategy.

(6) (U) The Defense Intelligence Plan provides a framework for DoD-wide integrated intelligence planning. It makes use of the JIEP and the DIPP in describing the future threat in terms of implications for Defense Intelligence in the mid-range period. It is applicable to those elements of the DoD involved in planning and programming for intelligence as a source document for: a description of the threat as it relates to intelligence and the intelligence environment in the mid-range—time—frame; a statement of the

comprehensive and key intelligence needs against which intelligence must work during this period; a presentation of prioritized capabilities to achieve required resources to overcome inadequacies in the support of Defense intelligence; and guidance in the preparation of plans in specific functional areas.

f. (U) Short-Range Intelligence Planning.

- (1) (U) Integrated short-range operational planning primarily involves development, coordination, and assignment of production and related collection tasks for the next 2 fiscal years. Such planning must be related directly to current user needs and to existing or budgeted resources. It is also an outgrowth of mid-range resources program decisions. The short-range period generally covers 2 fiscal years, the current year and the budget year, described in DoD Directive 7045.7. In most cases, the entire period can be covered by current intelligence collection and production tasking. Since existing resources are involved for current fiscal year operational planning, resources programmed for use or procurement in the forthcoming budget year usually have been, or shortly will be, approved by the Secretary of Defense and the President. While these resources cannot be used or procured until final Presidential signature on a Congressional appropriation act, this will normally occur in sufficient time for continuous current planning for the entire short-range period.
- (2) To support short-range planning, intelligence estimates must be explicit as to foreign military capabilities, trends, and force levels which are expected during the period

g. (U) Summary. The Defense Intelligence planning system is intended to integrate all military intelligence estimates, planning, programming, operations, evaluation, and management activities. It identifies and describes their use to meet the future Defense Intelligence collection, production, and support requirements. The system must support DoD programming and procurement decisions which involve billions of dollars and determine the national Defense posture and military capabilities of the future. The system provides guidance, goals, and objectives for collection, production, and dissemination activities to

insure that Defense Intelligence products and services are timely and accurate, and satisfy user needs.

- 3. (U) DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE RESOURCES PLANNING, PROGRAMMING, AND BUDGETING (PPB).
 - a. (U) Defense Intelligence PPB Responsibilities.
- (1) Defense Intelligence resources planning supports orderly development of the needed intelligence systems and military forces. It also supports related intelligence resources programming and budgetary requests to the U.S. Congress.
- (2) (U) Executive Order 12036, 24 January 1978, defines certain intelligence activities of Defense as part of the NFIP, and gives the DCI full and exclusive authority for approval of the NFIP budget to be submitted to the President. Within the Defense portion of the NFIP, there are five intelligence programs:
- (a) (U) The Consolidated Cryptologic Program (CCP) which comprises efforts of the NSA and SCA's engaged in the SIGINT mission.
- (b) (U) The General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP); which includes all Defense. Intelligence activities in the NFIP except SIGLNT and specialized national programs.
- (c) (U) Air Force Special Activities and Navy Special Activities, which provide essential information to national policymakers and to force commanders.
- (d) (U) The Defense Foreign Counterintelligence (FCI) Program, which consists of the counterintelligence activities of the three Military* Departments.
- (3) (U) Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, March 6, 1978, subject: Implementation of Executive Order 12036, Replacing E.O. 11905, specifically assigns responsibilities within the DoD for each area covered by the Executive Order.
- (4) (U) Approved NFIP programs and budgets are entered into Defense data bases and are included in Defense budgets presented to Congress.
- b. (U) Defense Intelligence P^DB Cycle. The various programs in the Defense portion of the NFIP proceed through similar steps in the PPB cycle, though

there are some differences. However, for the purpose of simplification, the GDIP will be used as a general example in the presentation of the DoD Intelligence PPBS below, and in the outline of the DoD Intelligence PPBS in enclosure 1, chart 5. The reader should be aware that variations exist between programs. In brief the cycle is as follows:

- (1) (U) Planning/Program Guidance. The DoD PPB cycle for a specific 5-year period begins with the planning/program guidance.
- (a) (U) The DIA prepares the JIEP (a JCS document) and the DIPP. These provide the intelligence estimative foundations for preparation of the JSPD.
- (b) (U) The JSPD is a mid-range JCS planning document designed, among other things, to assist the Secretary of Defense in preparation of the Consolidated Guidance (CG).
- (c) (U) The DIA publishes the Defense Intelligence Plan, which presents a view of the intelligence capabilities that must be acquired to overcome inadequacies, and, in the form of required capabilities, provides inputs to the Secretary of Defense's CG for the GDIP, CCP, Air Force Special Activities Program, and contributes support for NFIP decisions by the PRC(I).
- [(d) (U) The Program Manager's Guidance Memorandum (PMGM) is issued early in the PPB cycle to provide substantive intelligence guidance to be used for GDIP programs.
- (e) (U) Secretary of Defense provides broad policy guidance in his CG, which highlights his views and assumptions and those of the President relating to the ISPD strategy and related intelligence objectives and priorities.
- (f) (U) The DCI issues guidance for program and budget development for the NFIP, including the NFIP activities managed by Defense.
- (g) (U) Using the DCI guidance and the CG, the program manager issues a supplement to the PMGM which provides definitive information and specific instructions for GDIP program preparation.

(2) (U) Programming.

(a) (U) DIA and the Military Departments, as components in the GDIP, prepare and submit

proposed programs to the GDIP Manager.

- (b) (U) The GDIP Program Manager reviews the DIA and Services' intelligence resources requests; specifically, the manpower and dollars needed to achieve specified- intelligence objectives and requirements. Alternatives are considered in the search for the optimal allocation of resources. The process involves reviewing recommendations of the DIA and the Military Services, plus considerable internal review and analysis. The final program judgments result from "cross-functional review," based partially on quantitative analyses to determine which are the most beneficial "trade-offs."
- (c) (U) The GDIP Program Manager's Recommended Program (PMRP) is developed and coordinated within the DoD and is submitted to the DCI. The PMRP also ranks all the individual decision packages (brief justification documents which include information necessary to make judgments) on program or activity levels and resource requirements included in the PMRP from the most important to the least important.
- (d) (U) The Program Decision Memorandum (PDM) incorporates DCI decisions into the DoD PPB system.
- (e) (U) The approved programs become the basis for the GDIP budgets.
 - (3) (U) Budgeting.

FOR THE DIRECTOR:

OFFICIAL:

J. H. BOWMAN


Acting Assistant Deputy Director for Support and Services

- (a) (U) The DCI issues budget guidance. The Director, DIA, as GDIP Program Manager, issues supplementary guidance.
- (b) (U) GDIP budgets are submitted by DIA and the Military Departments to the DCI, with copies to OSD.
- (c) (U) Budget submissions are reviewed by OSD, DCI, and OMB. Budget Review Decision Documents (BRDD's) are issued by the DCI. Decision Package Sets (DPS's) incorporate DCI decisions into the DoD PPB system.
- (d) (U) After budget decisions are made, the Congressional Budget Justification Book (CBJB) is prepared, providing detail of budget requests presented to Congress.
- (4) (U) Enactment/Execution. Congressional authorization and appropriation lead to enactment into law and apportionment.
- (5) (U) Fiscal Cycle Overlap. Because of the length of time for the completion of the "annual" fiscal cycle, there are always three different fiscal year budgets active, if measured from JSPD issuance until final passage and signing of the Appropriations Bill (four different fiscal year budgets active, if the influencing/foundation documents, the JIEP, DIPP and Defense Intelligence Plan, are considered).

B. H. ANDERSON, JR. Colonel, USA Acting Chief of Staff

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NSC-RELATED INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES




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
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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE RELATIONSHIPS



ENCLOSURE (This page is UNCLASSIFIED)

DIAM 56-3



* SOME VARIATIONS EXIST BETWEEN PROGRAMS

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REVERSE

GLOSSARY

JCS Pub 1, "The DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms," contains the DoD standardized military and associated terms and definitions approved for joint usage, and is referred to herein. Supplementary information or additional explanatory matter necessary to provide technical clarity or convey a special connotation are designated by "Executive Order 12036," "NSCID," "NFIB," "DoD Directive S-3115.7," and "DoD Instruction 7045.7," and should not be construed as changing or conflicting with a standardized DoD definition.

Acoustical Intelligence. See JCS Pub. 1

Advanced Imagery Requirement and Exploitation System (AIRES). An information system for the integrated storage, processing, manipulation, and presentation of all imagery-related data. System will provide data rapidly to imagery collection and exploitation managers, photo interpreters, and production analysts. The system is highly automated to provide a responsive flow of relevant information throughout the collection, processing, dissemination, and analysis cycle.

Basic Intelligence. See JCS Pub. 1.

Basic Intelligence. Factual intelligence that results from the collation of encyclopedic information on a fundamental and more or less permanent nature and that, as a result of evaluation and interpretation, is determined to be the best available. (NSCID).

Combat Intelligence. See JCS Pub. 1.

Command-Dealcated Intelligence Unit/Activity. An intelligence unit or activity whose primary mission is tactical intelligence, and which is assigned or attached to, or operates primarily in support of, a U&S Command headquarters or Service component headquarters thereof.

Communications Intelligence. See JCS Pub. 1.

Communications Intelligence (COMINT). Technical and intelligence information derived from foreign communications by other than the intended recipients (ICS Pub. 1 and DoD Directive S-3115.7). COMINT is produced by the collection and processing of foreign communications passed by electromagnetic means, with specific exceptions stated below, and by the processing of foreign encrypted communications, however transmitted. Collection comprises search, intercept, and direction finding. Processing comprises range estimation, transmitter/operator identification, signal analysis, traffic analysis, cryptanalysis, decryption, study of plain text, the fusion of these processes, and the reporting of results. COMINT will not include intercept and processing of unencrypted written communications, except the processing of written plain text versions of communications which have been encrypted or are intended for subsequent encryption, intercept and processing of press, propaganda, and other public broadcasts, except for processing encrypted or "hidden meaning" passages in such broadcasts, certain operations conducted by security authorities; and censorship. (DoD Directive S 3115.7)

Communications Security (COMSEC). See JCS Pub. 1 and Executive Order 12036.

Counterintelligence. See JCS Pub 1 and Executive Order 12036.

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Cryptologic Intelligence Unit/Activity. An intelligence unit or activity whose primary mission is collection of COMINT or communications security.

Current Fiscal Year. The fiscal year in being. It refers to the fiscal year of budget execution.

Current Intelligence. See JCS Pub. 1.

Defense Intelligence. A conceptual term embracing all of the military intelligence and counterintelligence operations and activities of the DoD.

Defense Intelligence Community. The primary members of the Defense Intelligence Community include the ASD(C3I), the DUSD(PR), DIA, the NSA/CSS, intelligence staffs of the Military Services, the U&S Commands, their component commands, DoD intelligence activities, and the information handling facilities, equipment, personnel, and telecommunications supporting the Defense Intelligence mission.

Department of Defense Components. The Office of the Secretary of Defense, DIA, ICS, the Military Departments and the Military Services within those departments, the U&S Commands, and such agencies as the Secretary of Defense has established to meet specific requirements.

Departmental Intelligence, See JCS Pub. 1.

Department Intelligence Unit/Activity. An intelligence unit or activity operating primarily in support of a military department headquarters, whose primary mission is to satisfy departmental or interdepartmental intelligence requirements or the training of intelligence personnel.

Electronics Intelligence (ELINT). See JCS Pub. 1 and DoD Directive S-3115.4:

Essential Elements of Information (EEI). See JCS Pub. 1.

Estimetic Invelluence. Judgments, assessments, and projections of probable future courses of action and developments. It employs basic, current, and finished intelligence from all sources and agencies in arriving at conclusions. It is designed to serve planner's decisionmaking needs.

Evaluation, See JCS Pub. 1.

Finished Intelligence. Information which has been processed, evaluated, analyzed, collated, correlated, synthesized, interpreted, and formatted, as necessary, to satisfy user requirements. The process by which raw information becomes finished intelligence may not involve actual performance of any of the above operations except evaluation and analysis, but does require judgments on whether each of these operations is necessary before presentation to the user.

Fiscal Year. In the Federal Government, a 12-month period beginning 1 October and ending 30 September of the following calendar year. The fiscal year is designated by the calendar year in which it ends.

Five-Year Defense Program (FYDP). The official program which summarizes the Secretary of Defense approved plans and programs for the DoD. The FYDP is published at least once annually. The FYDP is also represented by a computer data base which is updated regularly to reflect decisions. (DoD Instruction 3045.7).

General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP). An aggregation of intelligence program elements of the National Foreign Intelligence Program which provides for military intelligence required at the national level and by major military commands (excluding tactical commands).

General Intelligence (Production). Military intelligence in the fields of area and terrain intelligence, including urban areas, coasts and landing beaches, and medical, meteorological, and geological intelligence; transportation in all modes; materiel production and support industries, telecommunications, military economics, military facilities and targeting, physical vulnerability, government control, escape and evasion, threats and forecasts, indications, and military capabilities, including orders of battle, organizations, training, tactics and all other factors bearing on military strength and effectiveness.

General Intelligence Unit/Activity. A non-cryptologic intelligence unit or activity, not designated as special or selected.

Human Source Intelligence (HUMINT). Collection in which human beings serve as both collectors and sources of information, or as document and equipment collectors.

Imagery Intelligence (IMINT). The collected products of imagery interpretation processed for intelligence use. (NFIB).

Imagery Interpretation (II). The process of locating, recognizing, identifying, and describing objects, activities, and terrain represented by imagery; it includes photographic interpretation. (NFIB).

Integrated Intelligence. Intelligence consisting of data elements from two or more basic intelligence topics combined into a specialized topic.

Intelligence. See JCS Pub. 1 and Executive Order 12036.

Intelligence Cycle. See JCS Pub. 1.

Intelligence Data. Information which has been processed and, to some extent, evaluated or analyzed. It may or may not be collated, synthesized, correlated, interpreted, or formatted in finished form.

Intelligence Data Base. See JCS Pub. 1.

Intelligence Data Handling Systems (IDHS). See JCS Pub. 1.

Intelligence Dissemination. The transfer of raw or processed information, intelligence data, or finished intelligence from one organization to another. Performance of this function by the disseminating agency includes the identification and selection of the recipients of material to be disseminated in accordance with their stated requirements.

Intelligence Estimate. See JCS Pub. 1.

Intelligence Information. Information of potential intelligence value which has not been processed, analyzed, or evaluated.

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Intelligence Information. Information of potential intelligence value concerning the capabilities, intentions, and activities of any foreign power, organization, or associated personnel. (NFIB).

Intelligence Report (INTREP). See JCS Pub. 1. (Also called Intelligence Information Report).

Intelligence Reporting. See JCS Pub. 1.

Intelligence Requirement, See JCS Pub. 1.

Intelligence Subject Code. See JCS Pub. 1.

Intelligence Summary (INTSUM), See JCS Pub. 1.

Intelligence Support Functions. Those functions which are not integral to the performance of intelligence or counterintelligence collection, processing, production, or dissemination, or to the performance of counterintelligence investigations, but which assist performance of these operations. (See Substantive Intelligence Functions.)

Intelligence Unit/Activity. An identifiable unit, activity, or staff element, or major element thereof, comprised of personnel and equipment, with the primary mission of collecting or processing intelligence information, producing intelligence, disseminating intelligence products, or of providing support for intelligence collection, processing, production, or dissemination by other units or activities. Combat units which collect intelligence information as a direct result of combat operations are excluded, e.g., the S2 staff of an armored cavalry regiment is an intelligence activity; the line units are not.

Interdepartmental Intelligence. See JCS Pub. 1.

International Terrorist Activities. See Executive Order 12036.

Joint Force Memorandum (JFM). A document prepared annually by the JCS and submitted to the Secretary of Defense, which provides recommendations on the joint force program within the fiscal guidance issued by the Secretary of Defense (DoD Instruction 7045.7).

Joint Intelligence. See JCS Pub. 1.

Joint Intelligence Estimate for Planning (JIEP). See JCS Pub. 1.

Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). See JCS Pub. 1.

Management of Intelligence Operations. Actions by higher authority to require, modify, restrict, or validate and support performance of intelligence operations at a lower echelon.

Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT). The quantitative and qualitative data derived from special sensing instruments not normally associated with HUMINT, COMINT, ELINT or IMINT. (See Chapter 4, paragraph 5.c.(4)(d) of this manual for added definition.)

Military Intelligence. Basic, current, or estimative intelligence on any foreign military or military-related situation or activity (NFIB).

National Command Authorities (NCA). See JCS Pub. 1.

National Foreign Intelligence Program. Consists of the programs of the CIA; the Consolidated Cryptologic Program, the General Defense Intelligence Program, and the programs of the offices within the DoD for the collection of specialized national foreign intelligence through reconnaissance except such elements as the DCI and Secretary of Defense agree should be excluded; other programs of agencies within the Intelligence Community designated jointly by the DCI and the head of the department or by the President as national foreign intelligence or counterintelligence activities; and the activities of the staff elements of the office of the DCI. See also Executive Order 12036.

National Intelligence. See JCS Pub. 1.

National Intelligence. Foreign intelligence produced under the aegis of the DCI and intended primarily to be responsive to the needs of the President, the National Security Council, and other Federal officials involved in the formulation and execution of national security, foreign political, and/or economic policy. (NFIB).

National Intelligence Estimate. See JCS Pub. 1.

National Intelligence Surveys. See JCS Pub. 1.

Operating Program. A specific line of effort or grouping of related projects to accomplish a single general purpose or goal against which there is an identifiable allocation of resources.

Operational Intelligence. See JCS Pub. 1.

Planning/Programming/Budgeting System (PPBS). An integrated system for the establishment, maintenance, and revision of the FYDP and the DoD budget (DoD Instruction 7045.7).

Processing. Those operations necessary to convert raw information to readable or exploitable form for use by intelligence production analysts (e.g., readout of ELINT recordings, imagery interpretation, and document translation).

Processing. Conversion of collected information and/or intelligence information into a form more suitable for the production of intelligence. (NFIB).

Production. Operations necessary to analyze, evaluate, collate, correlate, synthesize, and present intelligence to users.

Production. Conversion of information or intelligence information into finished intelligence through the integration, analysis, evaluation, and/or interpretation of all available data and the preparation of intelligence products in support of known or anticipated customer requirements. (NFIB).

Program. A combination of program elements designed to express the accomplishment of a definite objective or plan which is specified as to the time-phasing of what is to be done and the means proposed for its accomplishment. Programs are aggregations of program elements and in turn aggregate to the total National Foreign Intelligence Program. (DoD Instruction 7045.7).

Program/Budget Decision (PBD). A Secretary of Defense decision in prescribed format authorizing changes to a submitted budget estimate and the FYDP. (DoD Instruction 7045.7).

Program Decision Memorandum (PDM). A document which provides decisions of the Secretary of Defense on Program Objective Memoranda (POM's) and The Joint Force Memorandum (JFM) (DoD Instruction 7045.7).

Program Element. A description of a mission by the identification of the organizational entitie and resources needed to perform the assigned mission. Resources consist of forces, manpower material quantities, and costs, as applicable. The program element is the basic building block of the FYDP. (DoD Instruction 7045.7).

Program Objective Memorandum (POM). A memorandum in prescribed format submitted to the Secretary of Defense by the Secretary of a Military Department or the Director of a Defense agency which recommends the total resource requirements within the parameters of the publishec Secretary of Defense fiscal guidance. (DoD Instruction 7045.7).

Raw Information. Information which has not been processed, analyzed, or evaluated.

Scientific and Technical Intelligence. See JCS Pub. 1.

SIGINT Operational Tasking. The authoritative operational direction of and direct levying of SIGINT requirements by a military commander on designated SIGINT resources. These requirements are directive, irrespective of other priorities and conditioned only by the capability of those resources to produce such information. Operational tasking includes authority to deploy and redeploy all or part of the SIGINT resources for which operational tasking authority has been delegated. (DoD Directive S-3115.7).

Signals Intelligence (SIGINT). See JCS Pub. 1 and DoD Directive S-3115.7.

Strategic Intelligence. See JCS Pub. 1.

Substantive Intelligence Functions. Functions integral to the provisions of intelligence users; they include collection, processing, production, and dissemination of intelligence and counterintelligence, and the conduct of counterintelligence investigations.

Tactical Intelligence. See JCS Pub. 1.

Tactical Intelligence Unit/Activity. An intelligence unit or activity not included within the NFIP, whose primary mission is tactical/combat intelligence, and is assigned or attached to, or operates primarily in support of, a numbered army, fleet, or air force, or lower level unit, and whose resources are exclusively provided from and managed under General Purpose Forces Program of the FYDP.

Unevaluated Files. Library holdings which have been processed as necessary, but not collated, synthesized, correlated, interpreted, or formatted in finished form.

U.S. Intelligence Community. The "U.S. Foreign Intelligence Community" consists of those departments, agencies, and units which are authorized by law or presidential order to conduct U.S. foreign intelligence or counterintelligence operations. See Executive Order 12036 (4-207).

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KEY TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

Alphabetic	
List .	Term
a.	
ACOUSTINT	Acoustical Intelligence .
ADPS	Automated Data Processing Systems
AFSC	Armed Forces Staff College
AIRES	Advanced Imagery Requirement & Exploitation System
ASD	Assistant Secretary of Defense
ASD(C ³ I)	Assistant Secretary of Defense (Communications, Command, Control and Intelligence)
ASD(ISA)	Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
BRDD	Budget Review Decision Document
СВЈВ	Congressional Budget Justification Book
CG	Consolidated Guidance
Cl	Counterintelligence
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CCP	Consolidated Cryptologic Program
CIPR	Counterintelligence Publication Registry
COMINT	Communications Intelligence
COMSEC	Communications Security
CRITIC .	Critical Intelligence Message
CRITICOMM	Critical Intelligence Communications System
CSS	Central Security Service
DAO	Defense Attache Office
DAS	Defense Attache System
DC	DIA's Directorate for Collection
DCI	Director of Central Intelligence
DCID	Director of Central Intelligence Directive
DCI/IC	Director of Central Intelligence/Intelligence Community
DCP	Decision Coordinating Paper
DDSR	Document Dissemination, Storage and Retrieval System
DEA	Drug Enforcement Administration
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DIAVP	DIA's Vice Director for Production
DIO	Defense Intelligence Officer
DIPP	Defense Intelligence Projections for Planning
	Defense Intelligence Production Schedule
DIPS	Defense Intelligence Requirements Manual
DIRM	DIA's Current Intelligence Directorate
DN	
DOD	Department of Defense Intelligence Information System
DODIIS	Department of Defense Intelligence Information System
DPS	Decision Package Set
DSARC	Defense System Acquisition Review Council
DUSD(PR)	Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Policy Review)
EEI	Essential Elements of Information
ELINT	Electronics Intelligence European Defence Analysis Center

European Defense Analysis Center

EW Electronic Warfare

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
FCI Foreign Counterintelligence
FYDP Five-Year Defense Program

GDIP General Defense Intelligence Program

HUMINT Human Sources Intelligence
1&W Indications and Warning
IC Intelligence Community

ICDP Intelligence Career Development Program IDHS Intelligence Data Handling System

IGCP Intelligence Guidance for COMINT Production

IMINT Imagery Intelligence

INR Intelligence and Research Bureau (State)

IOB Intelligence Oversight Board

IPSP Intelligence Priorities for Strategic Planning IRAC Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff

JIEP Joint Intelligence Estimate for Planning

JLREID Joint Long Range Estimative Intelligence Document

JLRSA Joint Long Range Strategic Appraisal
JLRSS Joint Long Range Strategic Study
JSCP Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
JSPD Joint Strategic Planning Document

JSPDSA JSPD Supporting Analysis
JSPS Joint Strategic Planning System
KIR Key Intelligence Requirements

MASINT Measurement and Signature Intelligence
MENS Mission Element Need Statements

MIB Military Intelligence Board

MOP Memorandum of Policy (of the JCS)
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCA National Command Authorities
NCS National Communications System
NFIB National Foreign Intelligence Board
NFIP National Foreign Intelligence Program

NIE National Intelligence Estimate
NIO National Intelligence Officer

NITC National Intelligence Tasking Center
NMCC National Military Command Center
NMIC National Military Intelligence Center

NPIC National Photographic Interpretation Center

NSA National Security Agency

NSA/CSS National Security Agency/Central Security Service

NSC National Security Council

NSCID

National Security Council Intelligence Directive
OICS

Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

OMB Office of Management and Budget
OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense
PDM Program Decision Memorandum

PMGM Program Manager's Guidance Memorandum
PMRP Program Manager's Recommended Program
PPB Planning, Programming, and Budgeting
PPBS Planning, Programming and Budgeting System

PRC Policy Review Committee

PRC(I) Policy Review Committee (Intelligence)
PRD Production Responsibilities Document

R&D Research and Development

RDT&E Research, Development, Test and Evaluation

SCA Service Cryptologic Agency
SCC Special Coordination Committee

SecDef Secretary of Defense SIGINT Signals Intelligence

SIOP Single Integrated Operational Plan SPINTCOMM Special Intelligence Communications

S&T Scientific and Technical

STIR Scientific and Technical Intelligence Register

TELINT Telemetry Intelligence
UCP Unified Command Plan

UNAAF Unified Action Armed Forces (JCS Pub 2)

U&S Commands Unified and Specified Commands

US United States

USDR&E Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering

USEUCOM United States European Command